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Bank accounting conservatism and bank loan quality   
Abstract 
This study examines the effect of conservatism on bank’s own monitoring effort reflected 
in its loan portfolio quality. While prior research shows that timely recognition of expected loan 
losses reduces managerial risk taking through enhanced market discipline, few are the studies 
that investigate the implication of asymmetric timeliness of losses, otherwise known as 
conservatism, on bank risk taking or a bank’s own monitoring effort. Building on the premise 
that the monitoring benefit of conservatism in reducing bank’s risk-taking translates into better 
loan portfolio quality, this study documents that in a sample of publicly traded bank holding 
companies in the United States over the period 1994–2014, bank's conservatism is positively 
associated with loan quality. I also find that the effect of conservatism on loan quality is more 
pronounced for banks with high ex-ante information asymmetry or distress risk and during the 
low and high lending growth cycles when loan quality is likely to deteriorate. These findings 
should be of interest to regulators and policymakers who debate ways to incentivize banks to use 
their discretion inherent in loan loss provisioning in ways that is more informative and less 
opportunistic. 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the relation between conservatism and loan quality for a sample of 
public banks in the US. While there is some evidence indicating that timely recognition of 
expected loan losses serves as a monitoring mechanism (Beatty and Liao, 2011; Bushman and 
Williams 2012, 2015), few are the studies that investigate the implication of asymmetric 
timeliness of losses, otherwise known as conservatism, on bank risk taking or a bank’s own 
monitoring effort. This study attempts to fill this gap and takes a more direct approach by 
focusing on banks’ primary operational decisions - that is, making loans. The study builds on the 
premise that the monitoring benefit of conservatism in reducing bank’s risk-taking translates into 
better loan portfolio quality. By establishing a formal connection between conservatism and loan 
quality, this research complements and extends the literature on the benefits of bank reporting 
transparency. 
An emerging stream of research has viewed timely recognition of expected loan losses as 
desirable to curtail excessive risk-taking by banks (Bushman and Williams, 2012, 2015). While 
GAAP traditionally requires an “incurred loss” methodology for recognizing credit losses that 
delays recognition until it is probable a loss has been incurred, the complexity of loan portfolios 
allows substantial discretion in provisioning (Dugan, 2009).1 Banks’ delayed provisioning for 
expected loan losses can mask true risk of loan portfolios, and thus can deteriorate bank 
                                                 
1 On June, 2016, the FASB issued ASU No. 2016-13, Financial Instruments—Credit Losses (Topic 326) which 
requires banks immediately record the full amount of credit losses that are expected in their loan portfolios, 
providing investors with better information about those losses on a timelier basis. GAAP traditionally requires an 
“incurred loss” methodology for recognizing credit losses that delays recognition until it is probable a loss has been 
incurred. This model has been criticized as the recognition of loan losses is delayed until borrowers actually default 
and magnify pro-cyclicality of loan making. The new credit loss standard allows managers to incorporate estimates 
of potential future events, and therefore affords managers considerably more discretion than does the incurred loss 
model. 
3 
 
transparency. Because provision is made against expected loan losses, and bank capital is set 
aside to buffer against unexpected loan loses, less timelier provisioning may obscure true ability 
of bank capital to provide buffer against unexpected losses by forcing the expected loan losses to 
be absorbed by bank capital in the future. Consequently, most banking literature focuses on how 
banks exercise discretion in loan loss provisioning to understand the implication of timely loan 
loss recognition in banks. For example, less timely recognition of loan losses reduces banks’ 
willingness to lend which increases pro-cyclicality during crisis periods (Beatty and Liao 2011), 
increases risk shifting and illiquidity in the economy (Bushman and Williams 2012), increases 
equity price crash risks (Andreou et al. 2017), increases lending corruption (Akins, Dou, and Ng 
2017), and exposes banks to systematic downside risk (Bushman and Williams 2015).  
Notably, while most research focuses on the timeliness of recognition of loan losses, less 
attention is given to the asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition versus gains. Asymmetric 
timeliness is a different aspect of financial reporting from timelines in that asymmetric timeliness 
focuses on the relative timing of bad news release to good news while timeliness does not 
distinguish good news timeliness from bad news timeliness. Asymmetric timeliness is uniquely 
designed to provide contracting benefits by counteracting managerial tendency to disclose good 
news rather than bad news quickly. The fact that losses need to be reported sooner than gains 
effectively disciplines managers to engage in optimal investments and triggers early 
abandonment of poorly performing projects. Prior studies find evidence suggesting that 
asymmetric timely loan loss recognition, otherwise known as conditional conservatism, 
facilitates the efficient allocation of capital in the form of improved investment decisions. This is 
because it reduces information asymmetry which reduces financing friction and managerial 
opportunism by enhancing market disciplining of firms’ risk-taking decisions. Many recent 
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studies support this prediction (e.g., García Lara et al. 2016). However, relatively little attention 
is given to the benefits of conservatism in the banking industry. 
Studying the implication of conservatism in the bank setting is important because 
conservative reporting is particularly desirable for banks for the following reasons. First, debt 
contracting is the primary explanation for why conservatism arises in financial reporting (Watts, 
2003). Since banks are highly leveraged institutions, banks are expected to exhibit higher levels 
of conditional conservatism due to contracting demands, litigation costs and regulators’ 
preference (Watts 2003; Armstrong et al., 2010).  
Second, under more conservative accounting, managers report economic losses in a 
timelier manner, which counteracts managerial desire to report only good news and hide bad 
news and consequently facilitates informational transparency. Because banks are characterized 
as having greater information asymmetry and complex structure, conservatism, by requiring the 
timely disclosure of bad news, can be particularly helpful for banks (Flannery et al., 2013; 
Leventis et al.,2013; Levine, 2004). Central bankers prefer banks to exercise conservative 
accounting practices during economic upturns (Leventis et al., 2013; Turner, 2010). 
Given that banks are expected to exhibit high levels of conservatism, and that they are 
also in a position to gain substantial benefits from conservative reporting, it is important to 
examine the implication bank reporting conservatism on bank’s risk taking or banks’ own 
monitoring effort.  
In addition to investigating the overall effect of conservatism on loan quality, I introduce 
two conditional hypotheses. First, more conservatism is likely more desirable in mitigating risk-
taking incentives for banks when they have greater incentive to take more risks. Thus, drawing 
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on prior research showing that incentives to risk shift is higher for firms with high information 
asymmetry or distress risk, this study further examines whether the improvement in loan quality 
is more sensitive to conservatism when these banks have high information asymmetry or 
experience greater distress. Second, this study considers the role of credit cycles, as prior studies 
document that loan quality is highly sensitive to credit cycles. More specifically, this study 
examine whether the impact of conservatism on loan quality will be more pronounced for the 
times when the average loan quality deteriorates, that is, during the times of extreme lending 
growth cycles. In low lending growth cycle, banks face higher adverse selection costs because 
there is higher likelihood of unknown borrowers having been rejected by another lender. In high 
lending growth cycle, as the perceived benefits of monitoring diminishes, banks may be tempted 
to reduce their monitoring and screening activities. Furthermore, as bank managers have the 
incentive to cater to this high demand through excessive lending (Berger and Udell, 2004; Foos 
et al., 2010), the quality of loan portfolios will deteriorate in high lending growth cycle.  
To capture the degree of conditional accounting conservatism among banks, I use 
the Khan and Watts (2009) C-Score measure of timeliness of loss recognition for our main tests 
as well as the C-Score’s decomposition into C-Score associated with loan loss provision and C-
Score associated with earnings before provisions. Additionally, I develop another conservatism 
measure, loan loss provision asymmetry (LLP_ASY), by modifying measures of timely 
recognition of expected loan losses employed by Beatty and Liao (2011) who estimate the 
equation where loan loss provisions are regressed on lagged (previous 2 quarters), 
contemporaneous, and future changes (1 quarter ahead) in NPLs along with capital and earnings 
before provisions. In the spirit of Basu (1997)’s piece-wise linear regression model, I similarly 
modify Beatty and Liao (2011)’s model by decomposing the changes in NPLs into increase in 
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NPLs (=bad news) and decrease in NPLs (=good news). Then, I take the average of coefficients 
on increases in NPLs in the past, current, and future to capture the extent to which loss provision 
reflects asymmetric timeliness of bad news relative to good news reflected in NPLs.   
The main results can be summarized as follows: Banks with greater conservatism (i.e. 
banks that recognize loan losses in a timelier fashion) are likely to have higher quality loan 
portfolios, the output of good monitoring over loan making decisions. A positive association 
between conservatism and loan quality is more pronounced for banks with high information 
asymmetry, or high financial distress. Moreover, the positive impact of conservatism on loan 
quality is more pronounced during the recessionary period (low credit cycle) as well as the 
expansionary period (high credit cycle) compared to the normal times because both the degree of 
information asymmetry and uncertainty about the quality of banks’ loan portfolios increase and 
consequently loan quality deteriorates during those times.  
A number of additional tests are conducted to examine the robustness of the primary 
findings. First, I find that the effect of conservatism on loan portfolio quality holds across all size 
groups. Second, I estimate the baseline regression in first-differences where change in loan 
quality is regressed on change in conservatism and change in control variables (change from t to 
t+1) to mitigate the effect of bank-specific characteristics that are relatively constant over time. 
The results are robust to this specification. Third, the results hold to alternative measures of 
monitoring quality such as Z-Score and salary expense as a dependent variable. Lastly, the 
results hold for both poor and strong corporate governance subsamples. 
This study provides direct evidence on how conservatism affects banks’ lending quality, 
which reflect banks’ own monitoring efforts. While the prior studies (Bushman and Williams, 
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2012 ;  Bushman and Williams, 2015) look at the link between conservatism and risk profiles of 
banks, they mostly focus on systemic economy-wide risks or the market perception captured by 
stock behaviors using measures such as stock market illiquidity risk or the value-at-risk 
(Bushman and Williams, 2015), which is an indirect indicator for banks’ own risk taking.  
Furthermore, given that loan performance is closely linked to financial stability, this study 
contributes to the discussion of financial stability in the light of the recent financial crisis by 
highlighting the role of bank financial reporting quality. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 introduces the research methodology. Section 4 
introduces the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 covers the empirical analyses on bank 
monitoring efforts and financial reporting quality. Section 6 details some additional analyses, and 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
The banking literature posits that informational transparency plays a fundamental role in 
enhancing market discipline and prudential bank regulation.2 Market discipline is referred to as a 
process by which market participants monitor and discipline excessive risk taking by banks. For 
example, bank creditors can exert market discipline by withdrawing their funds, or demanding 
higher interest rates from riskier banks. For publicly traded banks, equityholders can exert some 
discipline by replacing management or by rationing their capital or demanding higher premium 
                                                 
2 There are two types of information asymmetry banks face. One is information asymmetry between borrowers and 
depositors, while other is the one between insiders (e.g., managers, loan officers) and outsiders (e.g., capital 
providers, regulators). This study intends to focus on the role of financial reporting quality on the latter type of 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
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on their investments. The key that allows effective market discipline is how reliable and timely 
the banks provide information regarding their risk exposure and performance (Stephanou, 2010).  
The role of reporting transparency is important, especially since the lack of transparency 
in financial institutions played a major role in the 2007–09 financial crisis by impairing bank 
supervisors’ and market participants’ understanding of bank risk (Acharya and Richardson, 
2009). Because banks are more opaque due to their inherent complexity of a business and the 
nature of the underlying assets (Morgan, 2002), transparent information is essential for the 
investors to monitor the banking industry. If banks choose to withhold information from 
investors, or disclose information that is not credible, they are opaque (Bushman, 2016). 
Additionally, banks are highly leveraged, and thus may exhibit greater conservatism because 
conservatism tends to enhance debt contracting efficiency (Watts 2003). More conservatism can 
reduce investor uncertainty about banks’ intrinsic value, strengthen market discipline over risk-
taking behavior, and provide disincentives for banks to suppress negative information that can 
engender capital inadequacy concerns. In this sense, conservatism is an important aspect of 
bank transparency because it reduces the managerial temptation to hide bad news by 
imposing timely recognition of expected loan losses.  
Prior studies find evidence suggesting that conservatism improves financial transparency. 
For example, Andreou et al. (2017) find that banks having lower conservatism are more likely to 
experience significant drops in equity values. Akins, Dou, and Ng (2017) find evidence that 
conservaitsm constrains lending corruption measured by the survey response of borrowers. 
Manganaris, Beccalli, and Dimitropoulos (2017) find the increased conservatism after the 
financial crisis among European listed banks, which is interpreted as banks’ attempt to increase 
transparency to alleviate the adverse consequences of the opaqueness. 
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Among the multiple benefits of conservatism, the most relevant to this study is the ability 
of conservatism to reduce managerial risk shifting behavior. A risk shifting problem is defined as 
a phenomenon where shareholders of firms with outstanding risky debt may benefit from 
increasing the risk of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Risk shifting is a more severe 
problem in banks than in other industrial firms, because (1) debt financing represents the 
predominant source of external funding for banks (Freixas and Rochet, 2008), (2) it is relatively 
easy for banks to alter financial risks without being immediately noticed by creditors (Myers and 
Rajan, 1998), and (3) there are implicit and explicit public guarantees for debts (Battacharya and 
Thakor, 1993).  
Conservatism can prevent banks from taking excessive risk  because it helps design an 
effective incentive contract for managers, assess and reward managerial performance more 
effectively in the presence of asymmetric information and payoffs (Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010). Riskier investments would subject firms to greater 
potential losses or gains. Under conservative accounting, losses need to be reflected in earnings 
sooner and in a complete manner, while gains are reported gradually over time. Thus, riskier 
investments can result in losses being reported in earnings in the short-term without a 
corresponding increase in the probability of reporting a larger gains in the short term. This 
implies that conservatism can decrease managerial incentives to make risky investments. 
Consistently, Kravet (2014) finds that under more conservative accounting managers make less 
risky acquisitions and that firms with accounting-based debt covenants drive this association. 
Similarly, in banks, managers are deterred to extend loans to riskier borrowers under 
conservative accounting.  Bushman and Williams (2012) evaluate the impact of conservatism 
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on the risk shifting behavior of banks and find that forward-looking provisions designed to 
reflect expected loan losses more timely is associated with increased discipline.  
Because conservatism improves investment efficiency by limiting managerial risk taking 
incentives, I expect conservatism can promote more prudent loan portfolio selection and deter 
managers from continuing or increasing loans to default-prone borrowers, resulting in lower 
default risks in the loan portfolio of the bank. Without conservatism, managers of banks with 
deteriorating loans have incentives to postpone revealing this to the market by increasing loan 
volume, which generates profitable upfront fees and boosts earnings despite the fact that these 
loans would ultimately result in negative net income. When conservatism is required, future 
anticipated losses need to be fully reflected in loan loss provision, reducing profit and capital 
levels on which manager’s compensation is based.  
Based on the above discussion, I hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, conservatism 
disciplines banks’ risk-taking over lending practices, leading to higher quality loan portfolios. 
The first hypothesis is formally stated as below:  
Hypothesis 1: More conservative banks have better loan quality. 
The relative importance of conservatism in monitoring investment decisions likely varies 
with a firm’s ex ante risk-shifting incentive. I consider two settings where ex ante risk-taking 
incentive is likely to be high: banks with greater inherent information asymmetry and banks with 
in greater distress risk.  
The greater information asymmetry between banks and outside capital providers, the 
more uncertainty on the value of a borrower’s assets. In turn, the true value of a borrower as well 
as that of loan portfolios is largely unknown, which results in greater agency costs for bank 
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stakeholders. Timely recognition of loan losses can directly help inform investors or depositors 
of banks’ true value (e.g., the value of loan portfolios) because the book value of a bank that 
recognize losses on a timelier basis provides a lower-bound estimate for the bank’s orderly 
liquidation value. Information asymmetry exacerbates risk-taking problems because greater 
information asymmetry hinders market monitoring, monitoring by boards of directors and 
regulators, implying greater potential for moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Jensen, 
and Meckling 1976). Therefore, managers in these firms have greater latitude to indulge their 
own preferences, such as consuming excessive perks or taking excessive risk. Information 
asymmetry can also exacerbate the financing frictions imposed on banks seeking to raise capital 
in response to negative balance sheet shocks (Beatty and Liao 2011; Bushman and Williams 
2015), which can adversely affect incentives of bank managers and lead them to make inefficient 
investment decisions (Goldstein and Sapra 2014).  
Prior studies suggest that the demand for conservatism arises from information 
asymmetry, and firms can gain more benefit from conditional conservatism when they have 
greater information asymmetry. For example, LaFond and Watts (2008) find that information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers leads to more conservatism and the 
implementation of accounting conservatism reduces information asymmetry. Consistent with 
this, Nichols et al. (2009) find that conservatism is more pronounced in public banks compared 
to private banks because the demand for conservatism increases with greater information 
asymmetry. Francis and Martin (2010) document that the positive association between timely 
loss recognition and acquisition profitability is more pronounced for firms with higher ex ante 
information asymmetry. Garcia Lara et al. (2016) find that the ability of conservatism to reduce 
investment inefficiency is greater for firms having greater information asymmetry. Conservatism 
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are thus likely to play an even more prominent role in reducing managers’ incentives to make 
unprofitable and overly risky investment decisions or delay project abandonment decisions. 
These arguments lead to the second hypothesis. 
H2A : The positive association between conservatism and asset quality is more pronounced for 
banks with high information asymmetry. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) offer a risk-shifting hypothesis in which managers of 
financially distressed firms maximize the limited liability option of shareholders by investing in 
a risky projects offering improbable high pay-offs at the expense of debtholders. Distressed 
banks are more likely to violate regulatory capital requirements and are poorly performing. Thus, 
banks could be motivated to use the discretion inherent in the loan loss provisioning to avoid 
violation of regulatory capital constraints. Following Bushman and Williams (2012) who find 
that the benefits of forward-looking provisioning in reducing risk-shifting problems are more 
pronounced in the subset of banks with low balance sheet capital or low return-on-equity (ROE), 
I test whether the effects of conservatism on loan quality are more pronounced for high-distress 
banks by using similar proxies to measure bank distress risk.  
H2B : The positive association between conservatism and asset quality is more pronounced for 
banks with high financial distress. 
Prior studies document that loan quality is highly sensitive to credit cycles. More 
specifically, this study examine whether the impact of conservatism on loan quality will be more 
pronounced for the times when the average loan quality deteriorates, that is, during the times of 
extreme lending growth cycles. 
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For example, during the low lending cycle (credit crunch), banks face higher adverse 
selection costs because there is higher likelihood of unknown borrowers having been rejected by 
another lender (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). During the high lending growth cycle which 
coincides with the economic boom, the default probability of average loans decrease as firms 
have a higher probability of having positive NPV projects to pursue. In turn, during the high 
lending cycle, banks may be tempted to reduce their monitoring and screening activities because 
the perceived benefits of monitoring effort are diminished. Furthermore, as bank managers have 
the incentive to cater to this high demand through excessive lending (Berger and Udell, 2004; 
Foos et al., 2010), the quality of loan portfolios will deteriorate. Consistent with this, Andreou et 
al. (2017) find that conservatism reduces the abrupt stock price crash risks particularly during the 
low and high-lending growth cycles.3 
As a result, in both low and high lending growth cycles, loan quality is likely to 
deteriorate and conservatism can play a greater role to improve loan quality as there is more 
room for improvement. In turn, conservatism and future loan quality can be more positively 
associated in the low and high lending growth cycles than the moderate lending growth cycle. 
Based on the above reasoning, I set up the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3 : The impact of conservatism on loan portfolio quality is more pronounced during 
the low and high lending growth cycles than the moderate lending growth cycle. 
 
3. Research methodology 
                                                 
3 During the moderate lending cycle where loan volumes are ordinary and screening and monitoring over loan 
portfolios are normally conducted, incremental monitoring benefits from timely loss recognition would be 
insignificant. 
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3.1. Conservatism proxies 
 (1) Khan and Watts (2009)’ firm-level conservatism measure (C-Score) 
Based on Beatty and Liao (2011), I use Khan and Watts (2009)’s bank-specific conditional 
conservatism measure based on Basu’s (1997) differential timeliness of earnings measure. Since 
market returns should reflect information about both incurred losses and expected future losses, a 
greater association between negative returns and current reported net income is consistent with 
timelier provisioning of expected loan losses.  Following prior research, I remove the 
observation with a price per share of less than $1 and with a negative book value of equity. I also 
require at least 5 annual observations to run each regression. 
NIit =β0 + β1Dit+ Rit (µ1 + µ2SIZEit+ µ3MBit+ µ4LEVit ) + DitRit (λ1t + λ2tSIZEit+ λ3tMBit+ 
λ 4tLEVit ) +  (δ1tSIZEit+ δ2tMBit+ δ3t LEVit + δ4t Dit SIZEit + δ5t Dit MBit+ δ6tDit LEVit )+εt  (Eq.1) 
 
Where NI: Net income (COMPUSTAT “ni”) divided by lagged market value of equity 
(COMPUSTAT “csho” * share price at the fiscal quarter end).  
R: Annual returns compounded from monthly returns beginning the second month after fiscal 
quarter end.  
D: An indicator variable that equals 1 for negative returns, and zero otherwise.  
MV: Market value of equity, calculated as the natural log of market value of equity 
(COMPUSTAT “csho” * share price at the fiscal quarter end).  
MTB: Market value of equity divided by book value of equity (COMPUSTAT “ceq”).  
LEV: Long term debt (COMPUSTAT “dltt”) divided by market value of equity (COMPUSTAT 
“csho” * share price at the fiscal quarter end).  
 
After Equation (1) is estimated, C-Score is constructed using the estimated coefficients as 
follows.  
 C-Scoreit = β3 =λ1t + λ2tSIZEt+ λ 3tMBt+ λ 4tLEVt + ε  (Eq.2) 
 By construction, the higher the C-Score, the more timely loss recognition.  
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Furthermore, to understand better the sources of conservatism, I decompose the C-Score into two 
components: (i) loan loss provision conservatism (C-Score_LLP) and (ii) earnings before 
provision conservatism (C-Score_EBP) following Andreou et al. (2017).  Specifically, I follow 
the same approach described above while replacing the dependent variable with either loan loss 
provision (LLP), or earnings before provision (EBP) then re-run the equation (1). Because 
conservatism is expected to manifest through manager’s use of discretionary loan loss provision, 
CON_LLP is expected to drive the results. 
(2) Loan loss provision asymmetry measure (LLP_ASY) 
I develop another conservatism measure by modifying the approaches employed by 
Beatty and Liao (2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012). In developing a measure of delay in 
loss provisioning, Beatty and Liao (2011) estimate the equations where loan loss provisions are 
regressed on lagged, contemporaneous, and future changes in NPLs along with capital and 
earnings before provisions. Following Basu (1997)’s piece-wise linear regression where net 
income is regressed on positive and negative stock returns, I similarly modify Beatty and Liao 
(2011)’s model by decomposing the changes in NPLs into increase in NPLs (=bad news) and 
decrease in NPLs (=good news) and estimate the extent to which loss provisions reflect 
asymmetric timeliness of bad news relative to good news reflected in NPLs. Specifically, I 
estimate the following piece-wise linear model. To extract bank-quarter level conservatism 
measure, I run the rolling regressions for each bank-quarter using the observations of the past 3 
years while requiring 12 observations for each regression.4 
                                                 
4 Bushman and Williams (2012), using international sample, estimate a similar equation as above for each country, 
and use the coefficient on ΔNPLt+1 as a proxy for forward-looking discretion in loan provision and the coefficient on 
EBP as a proxy for smoothing discretion in loan provision.  
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LLPt=α0+α1ΔNPLt-2+ α2  DΔNPLt-2  + α3 DΔNPLt-2* ΔNPLt-2   + α4ΔNPLt-1+ α5  DΔNPLt-1   
+ α6 DΔNPLt-1* ΔNPLt-1  + α7ΔNPLt+ α8  DΔNPLt  + α9 DΔNPLt* ΔNPLt  + α10ΔNPLt+1 
+ α11  DΔNPLt+2  + α12 DΔNPLt+1* ΔNPLt+1 + α13 CAPITALt+ α14 EBPt + εt (Eq.3) 
 
Where DΔNPLt+x is a dummy variable that is set to 1 for bad news for credit losses, that is, when 
ΔNPLt+x  is positive, and 0 otherwise. The capital ratio and earnings before provision are 
included to control for banks’ incentives to manipulate provision to meet regulatory requirements 
or to smooth earnings.  
I focus on the association between loan loss provisions and lagged, contemporaneous and 
future changes in NPL. More specifically, I use the lagged increase in NPL (DΔNPLt-1 ΔNPLt-1), 
contemporaneous increase in NPL (DΔNPLt ΔNPLt ), and future increase in NPL (DΔNPLt+1 
ΔNPLt+1) to capture timelier recognition of loan losses versus gains. The more positive 
association between loan loss provisions and increases in NPL for each time period is consistent 
with more conservatism, that is, bank managers who report conservatively will incorporate future 
increase in NPL faster than future decrease in NPL in provision.  
Therefore, the coefficient α3, α6, α9 and α12 capture the degree of conservative 
provisioning practice. I refer to the average of these four coefficients as loan loss provision 
asymmetry, denoted as LLP_ASY. 
The coefficients on DΔNPLt-2 ΔNPLt-2 (α3), and DΔNPLt-1 ΔNPLt-1 (α6) capture the extent 
to which current provisions reflect past deteriorations in the performance of the loan portfolios. 
The coefficient on DΔNPLt ΔNPLt (α9) picks up the extent to which current provisions 
incorporate contemporaneous deteriorations in the quality of the loan portfolio, while the 
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coefficient on DΔNPLt+1 ΔNPLt+1 (α12) picks up the extent to which current provisions explicitly 
anticipate future deteriorations in the performance of the loan portfolio. Because current GAAP 
requires an “incurred loss” methodology for recognizing credit losses that delays recognition 
until it is probable a loss has been incurred, I exclude α9 and α12 and only include the average of 
coefficients on lagged changes in NPLs. The inferences remain unchanged. 
To reduce the measurement errors, I use an indicator variable that is equal to one if each 
conservatism measure is greater than the median during the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
3.2. Empirical models 
3.2.1. Test of Hypothesis 1 
I use the following Equation 4 to test the hypothesis 1. I have included quarter fixed 
effects for all the regression analyses and statistical significance is based on heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered by quarter.  
LQit+1=β0 +β1CONit+ β2LQit+ β3SIZEit + β4ABSGAPit+ β5FEEit + β6ROAVOLit 
+ β7EFFit+ β8EBLLPit+ β9LOANit+ β10LGit +β11COMMit+ β12REALit  
+ β13CONSUMERit+β14CAPITALit + β15LIQUIDITYit +β16ChgGDPit  
+ Year dummies+ εit (Eq. 4) 
 
Where LQ represents loan portfolio quality measured by 1 year ahead non-performing 
loans (NPL) or net charge-offs (NCO). As bank monitoring effort is reflected in the bank asset 
quality (mainly loan portfolios), I use loan quality as a main proxy for bank monitoring effort. 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) argue that NPL is the most commonly agreed-upon definition of 
problem loans in both academic research and the trade press, and is difficult to manipulate by 
managers because loans much be reported as nonperforming if it is past due at least 90 days. 
While there is evidence that banks use discretionary loan charge-offs to manage capital prior to 
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the 1989 regulatory change (Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo, 1995; Collins, Shackelford, and 
Wahlen, 1995), charge-offs are often driven by exogenous factors and also, some loans such as 
consumer loans are automatically charged off when they become delinquent for a certain number 
of days. Therefore, NCO is also a relatively nondiscretionary measure of bank loan quality. Note 
that both NPL and NCO are a negative function of loan quality, so a negative sign on the 
coefficient on CON is consistent with the hypothesis. Additionally, I use two additional proxies 
for bank monitoring quality, namely the Z-Score and industry-median adjusted salary expense as 
a dependent variable for robustness checks. A more detailed description for these measures can 
be found in the robustness section.  
CON is one of conservatism measures, that is, C-Score, C-Score_EBP, C-Score_LLP, and 
LLP_ASY. I control for variables known to affect loan quality, largely based on Bhat and Desai 
(2016). LQ at time t is included to control for the serial correlation.  SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of bank total assets, ABSGAP is the absolute value of one-year maturity gap deflated by total 
assets, FEE is the ratio of fee income to total income, ROAVOL is the standard deviation of ROA 
over past 5 years, EFF is the ratio of non-Interest Expense to income before extraordinary items, 
EBLLP is earnings before LLP, LOAN is loans deflated by total assets, LG is loan growth 
deflated by total assets, COMM is agricultural and commercial loans deflated by total assets, 
REAL is real estate loans deflated by total assets, CONSUMER is consumer loans deflated by 
total assets, CAPITAL is equity capital deflated by total assets, Liquidity is liquid assets deflated 
by total assets. Loan quality is expected to deteriorate during slow economic cycles so the 
change in GDP is controlled. ΔGDP is the quarterly GDP growth rate. All variables and their 
construction are detailed in the appendix A. 
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A significantly positive coefficient on β1 is consistent with the hypothesis that better CON is 
positively associated with banks’ own monitoring effort. 
3.2.2. Test of Hypothesis 2A, 2B 
I modify Eq. (4) to test whether the association between conservatism and loan quality is 
stronger for firms with high risk-shifting incentives than firms with low risk-shifting incentives. I 
estimate the following model:  
LQit+1=β0 +β1 CONit+ β2 RISKSHIFT it + β3 CONit*RISKSHIFT it  + β4LQit  +β5SIZEit  
+ β6ABSGAPit+ β7 FEEit + β8ROAVOLit+ β9EFFit+ β10EBLLPit+ β11LOANit 
+ β12LGit + β13COMMit+ β14REALit + β15CONSUMERit+ β16CAPITALit 
+ β17LIQUIDITYit +β18ChgGDPit + RISKSHIFT*( μ1LQit+ μ2SIZEit 
+ μ3ABSGAPit+ μ4FEEit + μ5ROAVOLit+ μ6EFFit+ μ7EBLLPit+ μ8LOANit 
+ μ9LGit +μ10COMMit+μ11 REALit +μ12CONSUMERit+μ13 CAPITALit 
+μ14LIQUIDITYit +μ15 ChgGDPit)+Year dummies+ εit  (Eq. 5) 
 
Where, RISKSHIFT is either a proxy of information asymmetry or distress risk. I also use a fully 
interacted model by including interaction variables among RISKSHIFT and control variables to 
allow the coefficients on control variables to vary with RISKSHIFT. 5 
Information asymmetries are measured in two ways. First measure, INFASY, is a market-
based measure, which is the average of standardized bid-ask spread, stock return volatility, and 
idiosyncratic risk.  
Second measure is information asymmetries between the firm and debtholder reflected in 
the cost of borrowing. The borrower’s perception of a bank’s risk taking is reflected in the cost 
                                                 
5 The results do not change without the interaction terms between conditioning variables and control variables. 
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of borrowing because rational debtholders recognize managers’ incentives to engage in risky 
activities and incorporate value implications of managers’ future actions into the pricing of debt.  
Specifically, I examine the imputed interest rate on large time deposits (jumbo 
certificates of deposit or JCD). 6 I choose the jumbo-CD market to proxy for borrowers’ 
perception of a bank’s risk shifting incentives because most banks use this market as their 
primary source of marginal funds (Kishan and Opiela,2012). 
3.2.3. Test of Hypothesis 3 
The monitoring benefits of conservatism are likely to vary depending on the degree of 
information asymmetry between managers and capital providers. Presumably, during the low and 
high lending growth cycles which coincide with the economic boom and bust, information 
asymmetry on bank asset quality is more severe because the potential risk of generating problem 
loans are higher than normal times. Therefore, the monitoring benefits of conservatism are likely 
to be more prominent during the low and high lending growth cycles because conservatism can 
lower the negative consequences of information asymmetry by imposing timely reporting of 
expected loan losses.  
To test this conjecture, I modify the Eq. (4) and include the dummy variables that capture 
the different states of the lending growth cycles (High, Moderate, and Low lending cycles) as 
well as the interaction between these dummy variables and CON to see whether the role of 
conservatism on loan monitoring effort changes under the different lending growth cycles. 
Following Andreou et al. (2017), I employ the following model:  
LQit+1=β0 +β1 CONit+ β2HIGHt+ β3 CONt *HIGHt+ β4MODt+ β5 CONt *MODt 
+ β6LOWt+ β7 CONt *LOWt + β8LQit+ β9SIZEit +β10ABSGAPit+ β11FEEit  
                                                 
6 JCD (more than $100,000) were fully uninsured until Q3 2008 and partly uninsured (over $250,000) afterward. 
21 
 
+ β12ROAVOLit+ β13EFFit+ β14EBLLPit+ β15LOANit+ β16LGit +β17COMMit 
+ β18REALit + β19CONSUMERit+β20CAPITALit+β21LIQUIDITYit+β22ChgGDPit  
+ Year dummies+ εit (Eq. 6) 
Where CON is one of the conservatism proxies, CON_LLP or CON_BS, and 
HIGH,MOD, and LOW are indicator variables that correspond to the high, moderate and low 
lending growth cycles, respectively. The high lending cycle variable gets the value of 1 for years 
2000, 2005-2008, 2011-2015 and 0 otherwise. The moderate lending cycle variable is set to 1 for 
years 1994-1999 and 0 otherwise. The low lending cycle variable is set to 1 for years 2001-2004 
and 2009-2010 and 0 otherwise. The negative coefficients of CON*LOW and that of 
CON*HIGH are consistent with Hypothesis 2, that conservatism plays a more prominent role in 
helping loan monitoring effort during the low and high lending growth cycles. 
4. Data  
The sample includes publicly traded bank holding companies in the United States during 
the 1994 to 2015 period. The sample period starts from 1994 because Bank Compustat does not 
report quarterly NPLs prior to 1993.  I focus on publicly traded banks since stock price is an 
input of my conservatism measures. Stock prices of banks have been obtained from CRSP, and 
financial statement data are extracted from Bank Compustat Quarterly or the quarterly call report 
data (Y9C) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website. After removing bank-quarter 
observations with missing data for any variables used in the main analysis, the final sample 
consists of 18,358 bank-quarters representing 635 bank holding companies (BHC) when C-Score 
is used while 17,514 bank-quarters representing 600 unique BHCs when LLP_ASY is used. All 
independent variables are winsorized at the 1% to help control for outliers in the sample. The 
descriptive statistics are provided in Panel A of Table 1. The mean NPL relative to total assets is 
0.008, while the mean NCO relative to total assets is 0.002. The mean and median values of C-
Score_LLP and LLP_ASY are about 0.5, indicating the sample is evenly distributed with regard 
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to conservatism. The average bank in our sample has an asset of $14.92 billion (median =$14.59 
billion) and the mean (median) equity capital ratio is 9.1% (8.9%). The average bank derives 
about 25% of income from fee-generating activities such as advisory services. For the average 
bank in the sample, earnings before loan loss provisions represent 0.008 of total assets, the 
standard deviation of stock returns is 2.45%. The average loan relative to assets is 66%. 
Table1, Panel B reports Pearson correlations. The correlation coefficients between NPL 
and NCO is 0.581, indicating while the loan quality proxies are substantially positively 
correlated, they capture different aspects of default risks. As predicted, both proxies of CON are 
significantly negatively correlated with the proxy for loan portfolio quality, providing initial 
evidence that conservatism improves bank asset quality through the discretionary channels of 
loan loss provisions. In addition, the CON proxies are positively and significantly correlated. 
However, as the correlation coefficients are below 1, they still capture somewhat different 
dimensions of CON. Both CON proxies are positively related to SIZE, FEE, EFF, EBLLP, 
CONS, and LIQUID, indicating that banks with greater conservatism are likely to be large, 
profitable, and liquid and generate a larger proportion of their income from fees and consumer 
loans. CON proxies are negatively related to LOAN, LG, COMM, and RE, indicating that banks 
with greater conservatism have lower loans relative to assets, lower loan growth, lower 
commercial and real estate lending.  
5. Results 
5.1. Baseline results – Testing H1 
Table 2 summarizes the estimation results of the multivariate regressions testing whether 
conservatism helps to improve loan portfolio quality. Panel A (Panel B) uses the NPL (NCO) as 
a dependent variable. Note that a negative coefficient on CON is consistent with the hypothesis 
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that greater conservatism leads banks to improve their loan quality, presumably through 
enhanced monitoring over bank managers’ lending decisions.  
Column (1) reports the results from regressing NPL on C-Score using ordinary least 
squares. After controlling for bank characteristics, the coefficient on CON is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. In terms of economic significance, moving the C-Score 
dummy from 0 to 1, with other independent variables held at their means, decreases NPL relative 
to total loans by about 0.42%. Column (2) and Column (3) report the results from regressing 
NPL on decomposed C-Score, C-Score associated with EBP, and C-Score associated with LLP, 
respectively. In Column (2) when C-Score_EBP is used, the coefficient on CON is positive and 
insignificant(coeff=0.0007, T-stat=0.32), opposite to the predicted sign while in Column (3) 
when C-Score_LLP is used, the coefficient on CON is negative and highly significant at less than 
1 % level (coeff=-0.0019, T-stat=-22.60), confirming that the results reported in Column (1) is 
driven by C-Score_LLP, not C-Score_EBP. Moving C-Score_LLP dummy from 0 to 1 decreases 
NPL by 0.19 %, representing almost 28% decrease in NPL. Similarly, in Column (4) when 
LLP_ASY is used, the coefficient on CON is negative and highly significant (coeff= 0.0030, T-
stat=42.08), representing almost 37% decrease in NPL.  
In Panel B when NCO is used as a dependent variable, the inferences remain unchanged. 
Column (1) reports the results from regressing NCO on C-Score using ordinary least squares. 
The coefficient on C-Score_LLP is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms 
of economic significance, moving the C-Score_LLP from 0 to 1, with other independent 
variables held at their means, decreases NCO relative to total assets by about 0.07 %. Given the 
mean value of NCO (0.002), it represents a decrease of 35 % in NCO. Although the coefficient 
on CON is negative and significant across all C-Score measures (from Columns (1)-(3)), the 
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statistical significance of C-Score_LLP is greater than that of C-Score_EBP, supporting the 
hypothesis that conservatism mainly operates through the discretionary application of LLP, not 
EBP which is relatively non-discretionary. Similar results are obtained in Column (4) using 
LLP_ASY. The coefficient on CON is -0.0011 and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
consistent with the hypothesis that conservatism is associated with better loan portfolio quality. 
In sum, the effect of CON on loan quality is statistically and economically significant in 
improving loan quality, manifesting the monitoring roles of conservatism. 
Turning to the control variables, the coefficient on LQ  is positive and significant across 
all columns, confirming the auto-correlation in loan quality year over year. The coefficient on 
SIZE is positive and significant, suggesting that larger banks have poorer loan quality. The 
coefficient on ABSGAP is positive and significant, implying that the banks with higher interest 
risk have lower loan quality. The coefficient on FEE is negative with NPL as a dependent 
variable, and positive but not significant with NCO as a dependent variable. A positive sign 
suggests that banks drawing a higher percentage of their income from fee generating activities 
rather than traditional deposit taking and lending activities have poorer loan quality, and vice 
versa. The coefficient on ROAVOL is positive, implying that banks with greater operating 
volatility have poorer loan quality. The coefficient on EFF is negative, indicating that banks with 
higher cost efficiency have better loan portfolio quality. The coefficients on EBLLP, LOAN, and 
LG are positive, indicating profitable banks, banks with higher loans to total asset ratio, and 
banks experiencing rapid growth in loans have poorer loan quality, consistent with Foos et al. 
(2010). The results on the coefficients on COMM, CONS, and RE are mixed. The coefficient on 
CAP is mostly negative and significant, indicating that bank capitalization is positively 
associated with loan quality, consistent with Bhat and Desai (2016). This indicates that bank 
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capital strengthens monitoring incentives which in turn improves loan quality. The coefficient on 
LIQUID is mostly negative, indicating liquid banks have better loan portfolio quality. The sign 
on the coefficient on the change in GDP is mostly negative, suggesting that improved economic 
condition leads to better loan quality.   
For the remainder of the analyses, I only employ C-Score_LLP and LLP_ASY as a 
dependent variable because the main results confirm that these two variables drive the results. 
5.2. Conservatism and risk taking incentive – testing H2 
Under H2A an d H2B, I predict that ex-ante information asymmetry or distress risk can 
contribute to risk-taking incentives, and thus, the disciplinary effect of conservatism on loan 
quality would be more pronounced for the group of banks having greater risk-taking 
incentives. Table 3, Panel A and B contains the results of estimating Eq. (5) for each of two 
information asymmetry proxies. In Panel A, the coefficient β3 on the interaction between CON 
and INFASY is negative and significant across both CON and LQ measures. Similarly in Panel B, 
the interaction term between CON and JCD loads negatively and significantly, suggesting that 
the contribution of conservatism to improve loan quality is greater when information asymmetry 
is high. Overall, these findings suggest that the monitoring benefits of conservatism are greater 
for firms subject to larger information asymmetries, as predicted. 
Under H2B, I predict that greater distress risk affects the disciplinary effect of 
conservatism on loan quality. I examine this issue in Table 4, panels A and B, using two different 
measures of distress risk. In Panel A, the coefficient β3 on the interaction between CON and 
LOWCAP is negative and significant across both CON and LQ measures. Similarly, in Panel B, 
the coefficient on the interaction between CON and POORPERF loads negatively and 
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significantly, suggesting that the contribution of conservatism to improve loan quality is greater 
when distress risk is high. For both Table 3 and Table 4, the main effect of CON on loan quality 
is still present. Overall, these findings suggest that the monitoring benefits of conservatism are 
incrementally greater for banks subject to larger information asymmetry, as these banks are 
likely to take more risk. 
5.3. Conservatism and bank lending growth cycle – testing H3 
The results are reported in Table 5. With NPL as a LQ proxy, only the coefficients of 
CON*LOW and CON*HIGH are negative while the coefficient of CON*MOD is insignificant, as 
predicted. With NCO as a dependent variable, all interaction variables, CON*LOW, CON*MOD, 
and CON*HIGH, are negative and significant with the statistical significance of CON*MOD 
being only marginal at the 10% level.  Overall, the results support Hypothesis 3 that the 
monitoring benefit of conservatism to facilitate bank’s own monitoring effort is more 
pronounced during the extreme lending growth cycles when banks would likely carry lower 
quality loan portfolios than normal times.  
 
6. Additional analyses 
6.1. Subsample analysis according to size 
I examine how the impact of conservatism on loan portfolio quality varies across banks 
depending on their size. A number of studies have addressed the issue of lending performance by 
large and small banks separately (e.g., Beatty and Liao, 2011). Because the type of information 
used in the evaluation of a loan as well as organizational structure are significantly different 
depending on the size of the bank, it is important to check whether the relation between CON and 
loan quality documented so far also applies to all banks regardless of their size. 
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There are reasons to believe that the relation between conservatism and loan monitoring 
effort may be greater for smaller banks than for larger banks. Smaller banks are inherently more 
subject to greater information asymmetry. For firms with more unverifiable information or 
greater information asymmetry, it is also costly for outsiders to evaluate managers’ investment 
decisions and overall firm performance (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; LaFond 
and Watts, 2008). Therefore, managers in these firms have greater latitude to indulge their own 
preferences, regardless of shareholders’ interests. Conservatism is thus likely to play an even 
more important role in reducing managers’ incentives to make unprofitable and risky investment 
decisions for smaller banks. 
Alternatively, conservatism may not be a good indicator of information quality for 
smaller banks, weakening the relationship between conservatism and loan quality for smaller 
banks. For example, smaller banks are the main loan providers for smaller firms. Small business 
lending by small banks is characterized by relationship development and non-standardized loans. 
The literature suggests that relationship banking information may be a better source of 
information about small business credit worthiness than “hard,” quantitative information such as 
accounting reports or credit scores (e.g., Greenbaum et al.,1998; Diamond, 1991; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994). This indicates that financial reporting quality may not be a good indicator of 
monitoring effort for smaller banks. Because this paper theorizes that monitoring effort 
underpins the influence of CON on loan quality, the connection between CON and loan quality 
can be weaker for smaller banks. 
The banks are classified as small if banks have total assets between $500 million and $1 
billion, medium if banks have total assets between 1 billion and 3 billion, and large if banks have 
total assets more than 3 billion. I estimate Eq. (4) within each subsample. Results are reported in 
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Table 6. Table 6, Panel A presents the results of estimating Eq. (4) for large, medium, and small 
banks, respectively, using C-Score_LLP as a conservatism proxy. The coefficient on CON is 
significantly negative for all banks regardless of size, for both LQ proxies. The same inferences 
are obtained when LLP_ASY is used as a conservatism proxy in Panel B. The results suggest that 
the monitoring benefits associated with conservatism exist regardless of the bank size.  
 
6.2. Change specifications 
The results are consistent with the notion that conservatism affects the banks’ monitoring 
effort in their loan portfolios. However, other variables could be correlated with both 
conservatism and loan portfolio quality. Furthermore, if both conservatism and loan portfolio 
quality are choices of the banks, my analyses could suffer from endogeneity. In this section, I 
attempt to rule out correlated omitted variables and endogeneity as potential concerns. 
I estimate the baseline regression in first-differences where change in loan quality (change from 
t+1 to t+2) is regressed on change in CON and change in control variables (change from t to t+1). 
Employing a first-differenced specification mitigates the effect of bank-specific characteristics 
that are relatively constant over time.  
The results are reported in Table 7. Regardless of the choice of CON proxy or loan 
quality proxy, the coefficient on ΔCON is negative and significant indicating that an increase in 
CON is associated with an increase in monitoring effort (although only weakly significant with 
the change in NCO as a dependent variable). An alternative approach is to include bank fixed 
effects in the regression. Untabulated results indicate that the coefficients on all CON proxies are 
negative and statistically significant when including bank fixed effects. 
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6.3. Use of alternative asset quality measure 
My analysis is based on the assumption that better loan quality is the outcome of 
increased monitoring efforts. To shed further light that this premise is reasonable, I use two 
alternative measures to capture the degree of bank monitoring in this section. 
The first measure is the Z-Score, which is often used to measure overall bank risk. The 
premise behind using Z-Score as a proxy for monitoring is that bank risk is expected to decrease 
with heightened monitoring effort. Specifically, the Z-Score measures the distance from 
insolvency. Insolvency is defined as a state in which losses exceed equity (E < π) (where E is 
equity and π is profits). The probability of insolvency, therefore, can be expressed as probability 
(-ROA<CAR), where ROA (π /A) is the return on assets and CAR (= E/A) is the capital assets 
ratio. Following the literature, I define the inverse of the probability of insolvency as the z-score. 
If profits are normally distributed, then the inverse of the probability of insolvency equals 
(ROA+CAR)/σ (ROA), where σ (ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA. A higher Z-score 
indicates that the bank is more stable. Following Laeven and Levine (2009) who advocate the 
use of the log of the Z-Score over the simple Z-Score on the basis that the latter’s distribution is 
heavily skewed, whereas the former’s is not, I use the natural logarithm of the z-score, which is 
normally distributed. 7  
As another alternative proxy of monitoring quality, I use salary expense following 
Coleman et al. (2006) and Bhat and Desai (2016). The main presumption is that the quality and 
quantity of bank staffs reflect its loan screening/monitoring effort and ability. As this proxy 
focuses on inputs rather than outputs of banks’ monitoring effort, it is less likely to be related to 
bank’ risk or risk preference (Lee and Sharp, 2009). Using similar measure, Coleman, Esho, and 
                                                 
7 For brevity, I use ‘‘z-score’’ to refer to the natural logarithm of the z-score in the remainder of the paper. 
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Sharpe (2006) find that salary expense reliably predicts future loan losses. Following Bhat and 
Desai (2016), I use the median adjusted salary expense to total non-interest expense ratio as an 
alternative dependent variable capturing banks’ loan monitoring effort. Because bank size and 
loan composition affect salary expense significantly, the median salary is calculated for each size 
tercile within the tercile based on the ratio of commercial loans to total assets for each quarter. 
Unlike consumer loans which are mostly homogenous and monitored as pools, commercial loans 
are heterogeneous and takes more individual efforts to monitor, requiring higher salary expense 
for the same amount of loans.  
The results are reported in Table 8. In Columns (1) and (2) when Z-Score is used as an 
alternative monitoring quality, the coefficient on CON is statistically significant and negative, 
and the results are not sensitive to which CON proxy is used, corroborating a positive relation 
between CON and monitoring effort. The consistent results obtained using SALEXP (in Columns 
(3) and (4)) provides assurance that loan quality reasonably captures the banks monitoring 
efforts. 
 
6.4. Corporate governance subsample analysis 
Leventis, Dimitropoulos, and Owusu-Ansah (2013) argue that effective governance 
structures result in better monitoring of management and hence will favor the implementation of 
conservative accounting because greater accounting conservatism is needed to reduce the 
likelihood of managers’ manipulation and to enhance the quality of accounting information. 
Consistent with this view, they find that well-governed banks engage in significantly higher 
levels of conservatism in their financial reporting practices. If greater conservatism is associated 
strong corporate governance, then one may question that the results found in this study is driven 
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by corporate governance, not conservatism per se. Therefore, I examine whether the improved 
loan quality associated with conservatism differs for well-governed and poorly-governed firms. 
If corporate governance drives the results, then the results should be stronger for the well-
governed banks. 
 I divide the sample into weak and strong governance subsamples and repeat the 
regression analysis on these two subsamples. I use Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)’s G-score 
as a summary (inverse) measure of the strength of firms’ corporate governance. Firms whose G-
score equals or exceeds the median for the full sample are classified as “weak governance”, and 
the remainder are placed in the “strong governance” subsample. 
The results for corporate governance subsamples are shown in Panels A and B of Table 9. 
The results hold in both subsamples partitioned based on the full sample median of the corporate 
governance. This confirms that the results documented in the paper are attributable to the 
benefits of conservatism, not corporate governance. 
7. Conclusion 
This study provides evidence on the monitoring benefits of bank financial transparency 
defined as conservatism or timelier recognition of expected loan losses. I find robust evidence 
that banks’ quality of loan portfolios measured by the future levels of nonperforming loans or 
charge offs is increasing in conservatism. Furthermore, the findings suggest that this effect is 
greater when banks are likely to experience deteriorating loan portfolio quality, such as during 
the low and high lending growth cycles. Moreover, banks benefit from conservatism regardless 
of their size.  
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While the banking literature posits that transparency can promote bank stability by 
enhancing market discipline of banks’ risk-taking decisions, there is no research directly looking 
into the relation between transparency and bank’s own monitoring effort. Using financial 
reporting conservatism as a proxy of transparency, this study finds robust evidence that 
conservatism improves banks’ monitoring effort. Additionally, despite ample evidence on 
conservatism improving investment efficiency in nonfinancial firms, no study to date 
investigates this relation in the banking sector. Viewing loan portfolio quality as the outcome of 
banks' main investment decisions, this study contributes to the investment efficiency literature 
that the benefit of conservatism in improving investment efficiency extends to the banking 
sector. Also, this study adds to the literature on bank financial reporting transparency by 
highlighting its impact on bank risk monitoring effort. Given the benefits of bank transparency is 
shared by lenders as well as borrowers, these findings should be of interest to regulators and 
policymakers who debate ways to incentivize banks to use their discretion inherent in loan loss 
provisioning in ways that is more informative and less opportunistic. 
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Appendix 
Variable description 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variables : 
NPL Non-performing Loans (bhck5525+bhck5526) deflated by total assets (bhck2170) 
or Compustat “npatq/atq” 
CO Net charge off(bhck4635-bhck4605) deflated by total assets (bhck2170) or 
Compustat “ncoq/atq” 
Z-Score A negative value of the natural logarithm of the moving average of the return on 
assets (bhck4300/bhck2170) over the preceding 12 quarters plus the capital to 
asset ratio (bhck3210/bhck2170) divided by the standard deviation of return on 
assets. The standard deviation of return on assets is calculated on a moving 
average basis over the preceding twelve quarters.  
AdjSalExp The median adjusted salary expense to total non-interest expense ratio, where the 
median salary is calculated for each size tercile within the tercile based on the 
ratio of commercial loans to total assets for each quarter or Compustat “xstfwsq/ 
xnitbq” 
 
Conservatism (CON) measures:  
C-Score NIit =β0 + β1Dit+ Rit (µ1 + µ2SIZEit+ µ3MBit+ µ4LEVit ) + DitRit (λ1t + λ2tSIZEit+ 
λ3tMBit+ λ 4tLEVit ) +  (δ1tSIZEit+ δ2tMBit+ δ3t LEVit + δ4t Dit SIZEit + δ5t Dit MBit+ 
δ6tDit LEVit )+εt  (1) 
 
Where NI: Net income (Compustat “ni”) divided by lagged market value of 
equity (Compustat “csho” * share price at the fiscal quarter end).  
R: Annual returns compounded from monthly returns beginning the second 
month after fiscal quarter end.  
D: An indicator variable that equals 1 for negative returns, and zero otherwise.  
MV: Market value of equity, calculated as the natural log of market value of 
equity (Compustat “csho” * share price at the fiscal quarter end).  
MTB: Market value of equity divided by book value of equity (Compustat “ceq”).  
LEV: Long term debt (Compustat “dltt”) divided by market value of equity 
(Compustat “csho” * share price at the fiscal quarter end).  
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8 Bushman and Williams (2012), using international sample, estimate a similar equation as above for each country, 
and use the coefficient on ΔNPLt+1 as a proxy for forward-looking discretion in loan provision and the coefficient on 
EBP as a proxy for smoothing discretion in loan provision.  
 
After Equation (1) is estimated, C-Score is constructed using the estimated 
coefficients as follows.  
 C-Scoreit = β3 =λ1t + λ2tSIZEt+ λ 3tMBt+ λ 4tLEVt + ε  
  To reduce the measurement errors, I use an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if C-Score is greater than the median during the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
C-Score_LLP Conservatism associated with loan loss provisions (C-Score_LLP)  
LLPit =β0 + β1Dit+ Rit (µ1 + µ2SIZEit+ µ3MBit+ µ4LEVit ) + DitRit (λ1t + 
λ2tSIZEit+ λ3tMBit+ λ 4tLEVit ) +  (δ1tSIZEit+ δ2tMBit+ δ3t LEVit + δ4t Dit SIZEit + 
δ5t Dit MBit+ δ6tDit LEVit )+εt  (1A) 
Where LLP is provision (bhck4230) deflated by total assets (bhck2170). 
After Equation (1A) is estimated, C-Score_LLP is constructed using the estimated 
coefficients as follows.  
 C-Score_LLPit = β3 =λ1t + λ2tSIZEt+ λ 3tMBt+ λ 4tLEVt + ε  
  To reduce the measurement errors, I use an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if C-Score_LLP is greater than the median during the quarter, and zero 
otherwise. 
C-Score_EBP Conservatism associated with earnings before provision conservatism ( LLPit 
EBPit =β0 + β1Dit+ Rit (µ1 + µ2SIZEit+ µ3MBit+ µ4LEVit ) + DitRit (λ1t + 
λ2tSIZEit+ λ3tMBit+ λ 4tLEVit ) +  (δ1tSIZEit+ δ2tMBit+ δ3t LEVit + δ4t Dit SIZEit + 
δ5t Dit MBit+ δ6tDit LEVit )+εt  (1B) 
Where EBP is earnings (bhck  4300) + Loan loss provision (bhck 4230) deflated 
by total assets (bhck 2170). 
After Equation (1B) is estimated, C-Score_EBP is constructed using the 
estimated coefficients as follows.  
 C-Score_EBPit = β3 =λ1t + λ2tSIZEt+ λ 3tMBt+ λ 4tLEVt + ε  
To reduce the measurement errors, I use an indicator variable that is equal to one 
if C-Score_EBP is greater than the median during the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
LLP_ASY , I run the rolling regressions for each bank-quarter using the observations of the 
past 3 years while requiring 12 observations for each regression.8 
PROVt=α0+α1ΔNPLt-2+ α2  DΔNPLt-2  + α3 DΔNPLt-2* ΔNPLt-2   + α4ΔNPLt-1 
             + α5  DΔNPLt-1  + α6 DΔNPLt-1* ΔNPLt-1  + α7ΔNPLt+ α8  DΔNPLt   
             + α9 DΔNPLt* ΔNPLt  + α10ΔNPLt+1+ α11  DΔNPLt+2   
             + α12 DΔNPLt+1* ΔNPLt+1 + α13 CAPITALt+ α14 EBPt + εt 
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Where DΔNPLt+x is a dummy variable that is set to 1 for bad news for credit 
losses, that is, when ΔNPLt+x  is positive, and 0 otherwise.  
LLP_ASY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the average of the 
coefficients α3, α6, α9 and α12 is above median, and zero otherwise. 
Conditioning Variables (RISKSHIFT) 
INFASY An average of standardized values of bid-ask spread, volatility and idiosyncratic 
risk, where Bid-Ask Spread equals the annual average of daily spread scaled by 
the midpoint between bid and ask; Volatility equals the annualized variance of 
the individual stock returns for the previous 250 trading days obtained from 
CRSP; Idiosyncratic risk equals the natural logarithm of the standard deviation o 
the residuals from a market-model regression of excess returns on value-weighted 
market excess returns for 60 months (with at least 24 observations). 
 
JCD (Jumbo 
Certificates of 
Deposit) rate 
JCD rate equals interest expense on JCDs divided by quarterly average of JCDs. 
(RIAD4174 (or RIADA517) /RCON3345 (or RCONA415) x 4) 
Interest expenses on JCDs: Till 1966Q4: RIAD4174; from 1997Q3a: RIADA517  
Quarterly average of JCDs : Till 1996Q4: RCON3345; from 1997Q1: 
RCONA514  
The interest expenses on jumbo CDs (RIAD4174 and RIADA517) cumulate 
yearly and therefore I take first differences within each year to obtain quarterly 
interest expenses. Furthermore, I multiply the fraction by four to receive annual 
CD rates. The definition of the CD rate follows Acharya and Mora (2015) and 
Kishan and Opiela (2012). 
LOWCAP An indicator variable that gets 1 if a bank’s level of balance sheet capital(equity 
capital (bhck3210) deflated by total assets (bhck2170)) is less than 7% and 0 
otherwise. 
POORPERF An indicator variable that gets 1 if a bank’ ROE is in the bottom quintile and 0 
otherwise.  
Control Variables : 
SIZE Log of total assets (bhck2170) or Compustat “atq” 
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ABSGAP Absolute value of one-year maturity gap 
( “bhck3197+bhck3296+bhck3298+bhck3409”) deflated by total assets 
( “bhck2170”) 
FEE Ratio of fee income (bhck4079) deflated by total interest income 
( “bhck4074+bhck4079”) or  Compustat “(fccq+ idilbcq)/ niintq” 
ROAVOL The standard deviation of return on asset (“bhck4300/bhck2170”), calculated on a 
moving average basis over the preceding twelve quarters. Or Compustat “piq/atq” 
EFF Ratio of non-Interest expense ( “bhck4093+bhck4300”) deflated by total assets 
( bhck2170) or Compustat “ xnitbq /atq” 
EBLLP Earnings before provision(bhck4300+bhck4230) deflated by total assets 
(bhck2170) or Compustat  “(piq+pclq)/atq” 
LOAN Loan (bhck2122)  deflated by total assets (bhck2170) or Compustat “lntalq/atq” 
LG Loan growth (   “(bhck2122t-bhck2122t-1)/bhck2170t-1”) : or Compustat“ lntalqt-
lntalqt-1)/atq” 
COMM Agricultural and commercial loans(  “bhck1763+bhck1764+bhck1590”) deflated 
by total assets (bhck2170) 
RE Real estate loans (bhck1410) deflated by total assets (bhck2170) 
CONS Consumer loans ( “bhck2008+bhck2011+bhckb538+bhckb539”) deflated by total 
assets (bhck2170) 
CAPITAL Equity capital ( bhck3210) deflated by total assets (bhck2170) or  Compustat 
“capr1q” 
LIQUIDITY Liquid assets 
(  “bhck0081+bhck0395+bhck0397+bhck1773+bhck1350+bhck0276+bhck0277+ 
bhdmB987”) deflated by total assets (bhck2170) 
ΔGDP Quarterly change in GDP from St. Louis Federal Reserve website 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
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Table 1 Panel A  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
Dependent variables 
NPL   18,358  0.008 0.005 0.010 
NCO   18,358  0.002 0.001 0.003 
Independent variables 
Cscore_LLP   18,358  0.505 0.556 0.272 
LLP_ASY   17,514  0.502 0.500 0.351 
Control variables 
SIZE   18,358  14.918 14.591 1.331 
ABSGAP   18,358  0.673 0.659 0.224 
FEE   18,358  0.247 0.233 0.109 
ROAVOL   18,358  0.004 0.003 0.001 
EFF   18,358  0.025 0.023 0.013 
EBLLP   18,358  0.008 0.007 0.005 
LOAN   18,358  0.661 0.673 0.107 
LG   18,358  0.122 -0.037 0.630 
COMM   18,358  0.122 0.108 0.071 
RE   18,358  0.453 0.454 0.140 
CONS   18,358  0.056 0.036 0.056 
CAP   18,358  0.091 0.089 0.021 
LIQUID   18,358  0.231 0.219 0.101 
ΔGDP   18,358  0.025 0.027 0.017 
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Panel B: Correlation Analysis 
Variable NCO Cscore_LLP LLP_ASY SIZE ABSGAP FEE ROAVOL EFF EBLLP LOAN LG COMM RE CONS CAP LIQUID ΔGDP 
NPL 0.581 -0.136 -0.479 0.005 0.024 -0.074 0.123 -0.190 -0.055 0.258 0.173 -0.035 0.348 -0.287 0.106 -0.100 -0.543 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.482) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NCO   -0.144 -0.376 0.128 0.109 0.013 0.186 0.124 0.273 0.216 0.112 0.074 0.120 -0.013 -0.020 -0.170 -0.391 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cscore_LLP     0.082 0.025 -0.087 0.058 0.015 0.054 0.076 -0.120 -0.013 -0.035 -0.085 0.025 0.177 0.079 0.003 
      (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.657) 
LLP_ASY       0.202 -0.131 0.128 -0.017 0.127 0.037 -0.154 -0.051 -0.008 -0.213 0.138 -0.008 0.072 0.388 
        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.266) (0.000) (0.000) (0.275) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE         -0.039 0.539 0.076 0.080 0.142 -0.189 0.088 0.190 -0.413 0.144 -0.010 -0.015 -0.001 
          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.127) (0.030) (0.897) 
ABSGAP           -0.018 0.056 -0.016 0.002 0.209 -0.024 0.222 0.053 0.045 -0.140 -0.212 0.006 
            (0.009) (0.000) (0.015) (0.805) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.343) 
FEE             0.016 0.290 0.129 -0.256 0.029 0.081 -0.382 0.101 -0.029 0.111 -0.003 
              (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.658) 
ROAVOL               0.073 0.180 0.099 0.038 0.041 0.063 -0.032 0.105 -0.073 -0.019 
                (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
EFF                 0.773 -0.043 -0.051 0.057 -0.158 0.164 0.062 -0.044 0.164 
                  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EBLLP                   0.047 -0.029 0.093 -0.103 0.165 0.142 -0.079 0.077 
                    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOAN                     0.065 0.223 0.710 0.035 0.055 -0.605 -0.131 
                      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LG                       0.005 0.080 -0.108 0.058 -0.009 -0.124 
                        (0.501) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.184) (0.000) 
COMM                         -0.333 0.021 0.007 -0.125 0.040 
                          (0.000) (0.002) (0.304) (0.000) (0.000) 
RE                           -0.374 0.074 -0.356 -0.236 
                            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CONS                             -0.113 -0.160 0.261 
                              (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAP                               -0.002 -0.105 
                                (0.774) (0.000) 
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LIQUID                                 0.066 
                                  (0.000) 
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Table 2 Analysis of the effect of CON on Loan Quality  
Panel A: Using NPL as a dependent variable 
   Dep Var=NPL at t+1  
  CON=C-Score CON=C-Score_EBP CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept -0.0006 -0.25   -0.0007 -0.30   -0.0045 -7.62 *** 0.0009 0.26   
CON -0.0042 -2.42 * 0.0007 0.32   -0.0019 -22.60 *** -0.0030 -42.08 *** 
LQ 0.6796 37.21 *** 0.6876 37.58 *** 0.6655 30.35 *** 0.6669 108.11 *** 
SIZE 0.0001 1.99   0.0001 1.63   0.0001 1.66   0.0002 7.21 *** 
ABSGAP 0.0015 28.12 *** 0.0015 30.67 *** 0.0016 7.44 *** 0.0015 14.24 *** 
FEE -0.0008 -2.05   -0.0009 -2.20   -0.0005 -0.90   -0.0018 -6.75 *** 
ROAVOL 0.2620 6.31 *** 0.2789 6.45 *** 0.3002 6.07 *** 0.2985 7.74 *** 
EFF -0.0271 -3.78 ** -0.0256 -3.63 ** -0.0270 -4.32 ** -0.0187 -4.27 ** 
EBLLP 0.0802 9.84 *** 0.0716 10.15 *** 0.0815 4.63 ** 0.0656 6.16 *** 
LOAN 0.0038 4.99 ** 0.0038 5.19 ** 0.0012 0.78   0.0036 4.76 ** 
LG 0.0003 8.99 *** 0.0003 10.20 *** 0.0003 6.73 *** 0.0003 8.15 *** 
COMM -0.0022 -3.43 ** -0.0022 -3.74 ** -0.0004 -0.30   -0.0032 -5.79 ** 
RE 0.0003 0.65   0.0003 0.67   0.0020 2.05   -0.0002 -0.34   
CONS -0.0023 -3.52 ** -0.0024 -3.99 ** 0.0007 0.42   -0.0026 -7.61 *** 
CAP -0.0044 -5.49 ** -0.0050 -4.15 ** -0.0026 -0.67   -0.0038 -3.44 ** 
LIQUID -0.0025 -4.83 ** -0.0026 -4.76 ** -0.0030 -2.44 * -0.0031 -5.00 ** 
ΔGDP -0.1088 -0.92   -0.0962 -0.86   0.1374 1.57   -0.1658 -1.21   
Year 
dummies Yes     Yes     Yes           
Adj. R 
square 76.13%     76.06%     75.27% 
    
75.95% 
    
No. obs      18,358           18,358                  18,358           17,514      
The table reports the OLS regression results of the effect of CON on loan quality. All variables are winsorized at 1th and 99th percentiles. Please refer to the 
appendix for the definitions of these variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated 
by *, ** and *** respectively. 
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Panel B: Using NCO as a dependent variable 
   Dep Var=NCO at t+1  
  CON=C-Score CON=C-Score_EBP CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept -0.0046 -2.03   -0.0045 -1.97   -0.0009 -8.53 *** -0.0043 -1.77   
CON -0.0025 -3.92 ** -0.0007 -2.53 * -0.0007 -5.84 ** -0.0011 -4.64 ** 
CO 0.5851 26.60 *** 0.5965 30.59 *** 0.5834 36.61 *** 0.5762 27.97 *** 
SIZE 0.0001 5.96 *** 0.0001 5.44 ** 0.0001 5.46 ** 0.0002 5.91 *** 
ABSGAP 0.0004 4.30 ** 0.0004 4.70 ** 0.0004 4.47 ** 0.0004 7.20 *** 
FEE -0.0010 -17.24 *** -0.0010 -20.07 *** -0.0009 -29.17 *** -0.0013 -10.31 *** 
ROAVOL 0.1285 4.52 ** 0.1391 4.54 ** 0.1396 4.29 ** 0.1417 6.16 *** 
EFF 0.0075 3.39 ** 0.0079 3.39 ** 0.0063 2.90 * 0.0135 6.02 *** 
EBLLP 0.0551 6.48 *** 0.0492 5.86 *** 0.0569 7.80 *** 0.0399 5.87 *** 
LOAN 0.0016 5.05 ** 0.0016 5.22 ** 0.0017 4.27 ** 0.0021 5.03 ** 
LG 0.0001 17.35 *** 0.0001 33.04 *** 0.0001 15.35 *** 0.0001 5.76 ** 
COMM -0.0002 -4.63 ** -0.0003 -6.65 *** -0.0006 -5.07 ** -0.0010 -9.45 *** 
RE -0.0005 -3.97 ** -0.0005 -4.35 ** -0.0007 -4.91 ** -0.0009 -4.76 ** 
CONS 0.0007 2.68 * 0.0007 2.36 * 0.0002 0.85   0.0004 2.08   
CAP -0.0048 -5.65 ** -0.0054 -6.25 *** -0.0042 -4.21 ** -0.0053 -8.56 *** 
LIQUID -0.0004 -5.71 ** -0.0005 -5.46 ** -0.0004 -2.92 * -0.0003 -1.90   
ΔGDP 0.0943 1.11   0.0948 1.13   -0.0349 -2.27   0.0645 0.68   
Year 
dummies Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R 
square 62.13% 
    
62.74%     61.90%     62.39%     
No. obs      18,358           18,358           18,358           17,514      
The table reports the OLS regression results of the effect of conservatism on loan quality. All variables are winsorized at 1th and 99th percentiles. Please refer to 
the appendix for the definitions of these variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
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Table 3 The conditional effect of information asymmetry on the relation between conservatism and loan quality   
Panel A : Information asymmetry measured by the market measure   
  Dep Var=NPL at t+1 Dep Var=NCO at t+1 
  CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept -0.0067 -5.18 ** -0.0006 -0.71   -0.0058 -2.02   -0.0094 -2.88 * 
CON -0.0006 -6.10 *** -0.0025 -12.36 *** -0.0009 -11.71 *** -0.0009 -3.77 ** 
INFASY -0.0033 -14.78 *** 0.0013 0.96   -0.0043 -2.63 * -0.0026 -9.73 *** 
CON*INFASY -0.0003 -2.46 * -0.0011 -3.01 * -0.0004 -2.14 * -0.0004 -4.48 ** 
LQ 0.5446 37.20 *** 0.6826 46.57 *** 0.8236 46.94 *** 0.5785 28.02 *** 
LQ*INFASY -0.0349 -3.30 ** -0.0467 -2.73 * -0.0222 -2.09   -0.0451 -3.67 ** 
SIZE*INFASY 0.0001 41.50 *** -0.0001 -2.51 * 0.0001 6.42 *** 0.0001 4.85 ** 
ABSGAP*INFASY 0.0006 5.60 ** 0.0004 4.44 ** 0.0003 1.73   0.0005 3.85 ** 
FEE*INFASY -0.0003 -3.77 ** 0.0022 6.31 *** -0.0003 -0.58   0.0000 0.06   
ROAVOL*INFASY 0.1065 6.02 *** -0.1007 -1.81   0.0723 2.88 * 0.0747 2.92 * 
EFF*INFASY 0.0161 5.08 ** -0.0391 -4.66 ** -0.0104 -2.93 * 0.0095 3.69 ** 
EBLLP*INFASY 0.0195 3.08 * 0.0438 2.09   0.0234 2.30   0.0175 2.21   
LOAN*INFASY 0.0006 0.79   0.0076 6.17 *** 0.0040 5.06 ** -0.0004 -0.55   
LG*INFASY 0.0001 3.06 * 0.0000 -0.73   0.0000 0.43   0.0001 2.09   
COMM*INFASY 0.0002 0.24   -0.0105 -8.28 *** -0.0023 -1.39   0.0007 1.10   
RE*INFASY 0.0016 2.45 * -0.0033 -2.79 * 0.0003 0.23   0.0024 4.98 ** 
CONS*INFASY -0.0007 -0.76   -0.0069 -5.83 ** -0.0030 -4.86 ** 0.0014 2.18   
CAP*INFASY 0.0001 0.04   -0.0045 -1.53   0.0010 0.39   -0.0011 -1.05   
LIQUID*INFASY 0.0002 0.80   -0.0004 -0.65   0.0006 0.93   0.0001 0.43   
ΔGDP*INFASY -0.0054 -2.81 * 0.0068 0.90   0.0015 0.18   -0.0075 -3.81 ** 
SIZE 0.0001 4.92 ** 0.0002 4.17 ** 0.0000 1.09   0.0002 4.90 ** 
ABSGAP 0.0004 5.63 ** 0.0014 7.54 *** 0.0008 3.75 ** 0.0003 5.81 ** 
FEE -0.0008 -3.33 ** -0.0004 -0.41   0.0001 0.25   -0.0010 -3.47 ** 
ROAVOL 0.0909 5.40 ** 0.2541 4.66 ** 0.1123 2.68 * 0.0969 7.03 *** 
EFF 0.0067 2.48 * -0.0369 -4.03 ** -0.0212 -1.20   0.0111 4.65 ** 
EBLLP 0.0717 8.97 *** 0.0532 3.25 ** 0.0681 6.71 *** 0.0537 5.47 ** 
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LOAN 0.0017 3.45 ** -0.0001 -0.13   0.0018 6.33 *** 0.0016 2.79 * 
LG 0.0001 15.56 *** 0.0002 1.77   0.0001 6.34 *** 0.0001 5.70 ** 
COMM -0.0001 -0.37   0.0011 1.67   -0.0010 -0.88   -0.0002 -0.92   
RE -0.0002 -0.56   0.0043 5.73 ** 0.0009 1.25   -0.0002 -0.44   
CONS 0.0003 0.73   0.0016 2.41 * -0.0006 -1.03   0.0001 0.47   
CAP -0.0037 -4.53 ** 0.0005 0.54   0.0037 2.77 * -0.0037 -4.58 ** 
LIQUID -0.0001 -0.51   -0.0030 -10.41 *** -0.0011 -2.36 * -0.0001 -0.84   
ΔGDP 0.1720 3.56 ** -0.1269 -2.07   0.1651 1.68   0.2661 1.96   
Year dummies Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R square 69.27%     79.08%     67.22%     68.71%     
No. obs      10,990           10,905           10,990           10,905      
 
Panel B: Information asymmetry measured by JDC rate  
  Dep Var=NPL at t+1 Dep Var=NCO at t+1 
  CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept -0.0159 -5.39 ** -0.0117 -5.58 ** 0.0027 0.90   0.0032 0.99   
CON -0.0012 -3.44 ** -0.0018 -3.61 ** -0.0004 -6.11 *** -0.0004 -2.56 * 
JCD -0.0120 -5.94 *** -0.0132 -6.09 *** -0.0056 -3.76 ** -0.0051 -3.21 ** 
CON*JCD -0.0012 -2.92 * -0.0024 -5.57 ** -0.0005 -8.27 *** -0.0014 -7.04 *** 
LQ 0.7135 52.43 *** 0.6908 116.89 *** 0.5074 15.44 *** 0.5043 13.66 *** 
LQ*JDC -0.1004 -5.17 ** -0.0682 -3.00 * 0.0948 2.26   0.0810 1.62   
SIZE*JCD 0.0005 4.99 ** 0.0005 4.47 ** 0.0003 5.41 ** 0.0003 7.90 *** 
ABSGAP*JCD -0.0003 -0.50   0.0006 3.01 * 0.0003 1.20   0.0002 1.01   
FEE*JCD -0.0052 -4.46 ** -0.0046 -6.52 *** -0.0013 -5.87 *** -0.0018 -5.57 ** 
ROAVOL*JCD 0.5916 7.24 *** 0.6060 5.99 *** 0.1532 4.26 ** 0.1529 4.23 ** 
EFF*JCD 0.0676 3.70 ** 0.0589 2.91 * 0.0130 2.61 * 0.0097 0.99   
EBLLP*JCD -0.1278 -2.14   -0.1011 -1.85   -0.0340 -2.19   -0.0179 -0.58   
LOAN*JCD 0.0036 1.25   0.0052 2.64 * 0.0020 1.94   0.0031 2.04   
LG*JCD 0.0006 6.39 *** 0.0005 2.56 * 0.0001 2.73 * 0.0001 2.67 * 
COMM*JCD 0.0067 3.30 ** 0.0028 1.78   0.0019 4.16 ** -0.0010 -0.94   
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RE*JCD 0.0029 3.13 * 0.0004 0.42   -0.0001 -0.11   -0.0021 -1.75   
CONS*JCD 0.0004 0.32   -0.0019 -3.44 ** 0.0004 0.38   -0.0007 -0.44   
CAP*JCD -0.0038 -1.20   -0.0027 -0.84   0.0065 2.07   0.0042 1.41   
LIQUID*JCD 0.0038 1.35   0.0039 1.84   0.0008 2.32   0.0002 0.38   
ΔGDP*JCD -0.0172 -0.79   0.0261 1.49   -0.0205 -1.59   -0.0135 -1.19   
SIZE -0.0002 -1.66   0.0000 -0.24   -0.0001 -1.67   0.0000 -0.32   
ABSGAP 0.0015 6.55 *** 0.0011 13.90 *** 0.0002 1.66   0.0002 1.46   
FEE 0.0015 1.26   0.0003 0.57   -0.0005 -3.34 ** -0.0005 -2.38 * 
ROAVOL 0.0328 0.57   0.0390 0.72   0.0760 1.85   0.0767 1.96   
EFF -0.0613 -4.04 ** -0.0472 -3.40 ** 0.0014 0.49   0.0090 1.38   
EBLLP 0.1513 3.89 ** 0.1171 3.61 ** 0.0624 6.58 *** 0.0412 1.87   
LOAN 0.0017 0.81   0.0017 1.39   0.0004 0.83   0.0006 0.93   
LG 0.0000 0.20   0.0001 0.81   0.0001 6.28 *** 0.0001 1.35   
COMM -0.0068 -7.53 *** -0.0057 -13.25 *** -0.0012 -9.56 *** -0.0003 -0.67   
RE -0.0016 -3.30 ** -0.0007 -0.94   -0.0004 -1.53   0.0002 0.39   
CONS -0.0034 -4.27 ** -0.0019 -3.99 ** 0.0001 0.22   0.0006 0.64   
CAP 0.0009 0.40   -0.0024 -1.28   -0.0065 -2.75 * -0.0069 -3.74 ** 
LIQUID -0.0048 -2.50 * -0.0049 -4.00 ** -0.0010 -4.93 ** -0.0005 -1.80   
ΔGDP 0.9082 7.30 *** 0.6708 22.97 *** -0.0590 -0.58   -0.1391 -1.19   
Year dummies Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R square 77.02%     76.43%     63.11%     63.23%     
No. obs      16,601           15,905           16,601           15,905      
 
Table 4 The conditional effect of distress risk on the relation between conservatism and loan quality   
Panel A: Distress risk measured by low capital ratio 
  Dep Var=NPL at t+1 Dep Var=NCO at t+1 
  CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept 0.0003 0.11   -0.0015 -0.41   -0.0043 -2.00   -0.0050 -2.05   
CON -0.0016 -20.09 *** -0.0008 -14.97 *** -0.0007 -5.69 ** -0.0004 -3.95 ** 
LOWCAP -0.0027 -3.21 ** 0.0006 0.58   -0.0003 -0.33   -0.0010 -2.33   
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CON*LOWCAP -0.0017 -4.32 ** -0.0006 -3.61 ** -0.0005 -5.96 *** 0.0000 -0.22   
LQ 0.6812 40.64 *** 0.6959 315.77 *** 0.5759 26.75 *** 0.5885 28.31 *** 
LQ*LOWCAP -0.0421 -2.30   -0.0007 -0.08   -0.0090 -0.48   -0.0020 -0.14   
SIZE*LOWCAP 0.0001 2.06   0.0002 6.99 *** 0.0000 1.36   0.0001 3.20 ** 
ABSGAP*LOWCAP -0.0005 -1.82   -0.0006 -2.14   -0.0005 -4.08 ** -0.0004 -5.44 ** 
FEE*LOWCAP 0.0002 0.24   -0.0001 -0.09   0.0002 2.79 * -0.0003 -1.03   
ROAVOL*LOWCAP 0.1424 0.95   -0.0674 -0.68   0.0670 2.20   0.0127 0.56   
EFF*LOWCAP 0.0218 1.08   0.0123 1.80   0.0100 5.23 ** 0.0063 1.29   
EBLLP*LOWCAP -0.1045 -1.47   -0.0948 -3.60 ** -0.0027 -0.45   -0.0108 -0.92   
LOAN*LOWCAP 0.0006 0.19   -0.0007 -0.28   -0.0025 -5.27 ** -0.0011 -1.09   
LG*LOWCAP 0.0001 0.18   0.0000 0.01   0.0002 1.84   0.0001 2.67 * 
COMM*LOWCAP 0.0025 1.08   -0.0054 -1.46   0.0032 5.27 ** 0.0006 0.79   
RE*LOWCAP -0.0003 -0.12   -0.0017 -0.76   0.0021 5.29 ** 0.0013 1.63   
CONS*LOWCAP 0.0005 0.22   -0.0009 -0.34   0.0036 4.88 ** 0.0012 1.07   
LIQUID*LOWCAP 0.0005 0.34   -0.0022 -2.31   0.0001 0.28   0.0002 0.37   
ΔGDP*LOWCAP 0.0022 0.58   0.0057 1.33   0.0008 0.16   0.0018 0.52   
SIZE 0.0000 1.13   0.0001 3.62 ** 0.0001 6.15 *** 0.0001 7.92 *** 
ABSGAP 0.0015 22.00 *** 0.0019 13.24 *** 0.0004 5.65 ** 0.0005 7.25 *** 
FEE -0.0007 -1.88 * -0.0017 -4.40 ** -0.0010 -23.22 *** -0.0012 -23.37 *** 
ROAVOL 0.2793 8.85 *** 0.2981 7.22 *** 0.1326 4.27 ** 0.1322 5.66 ** 
EFF -0.0325 -3.63 ** -0.0271 -4.14 ** 0.0060 2.56 * 0.0099 3.53 ** 
EBLLP 0.0998 6.08 *** 0.0959 5.60 ** 0.0576 7.61 *** 0.0452 7.21 *** 
LOAN 0.0033 9.16 *** 0.0039 9.08 *** 0.0019 4.51 ** 0.0026 3.50 ** 
LG 0.0003 5.38 ** 0.0003 3.22 ** 0.0001 10.75 *** 0.0001 4.50 ** 
COMM -0.0028 -9.41 *** -0.0014 -2.06   -0.0009 -5.16 ** -0.0010 -3.46 ** 
RE 0.0001 0.52   0.0003 1.11   -0.0010 -4.05 ** -0.0012 -2.80 * 
CONS -0.0021 -5.05 ** -0.0029 -4.78 ** 0.0002 1.33   -0.0001 -0.48   
LIQUID -0.0027 -5.46 ** -0.0024 -4.02 ** -0.0005 -6.90 *** -0.0002 -0.99   
ΔGDP -0.0879 -0.66   -0.1188 -0.75   0.0976 1.19   0.0659 0.73   
Year dummies Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R square 76.42%     75.43%     62.46%     61.43%     
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No. obs      18,358           17,514           18,358           17,514      
 
Panel B: Distress risk measured by return on equity (ROE) 
  Dep Var=NPL at t+1 Dep Var=NCO at t+1 
  CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept 0.0007 0.27   0.0002 0.07   -0.0037 -1.70   0.0002 0.07   
CON -0.0017 -50.38 *** -0.0025 -21.07 *** -0.0006 -6.24 *** -0.0013 -6.33 *** 
POORPERF -0.0013 -0.91   0.0028 1.13   -0.0039 -2.26   -0.0023 -1.03   
CON*POORPERF -0.0009 -4.94 ** -0.0022 -4.64 ** -0.0006 -1.94 * 0.0002 1.14   
LQ 0.6625 33.61 *** 0.6679 98.78 *** 0.5688 70.05 *** 0.3374 42.80 *** 
LQ*POORPERF -0.0006 -0.03   -0.0330 -3.07 * -0.1130 -2.34 * -0.0319 -0.56   
SIZE*POORPERF 0.0001 1.84 * 0.0001 1.38   0.0002 3.16 * 0.0001 1.58   
ABSGAP*POORPERF 0.0014 4.91 ** 0.0010 5.19 ** 0.0006 1.59   0.0004 1.08   
FEE*POORPERF 0.0002 0.16   0.0007 0.83   -0.0020 -3.69 ** -0.0008 -1.13   
ROAVOL*POORPERF -0.2469 -2.19 * -0.2177 -3.21 ** 0.2041 2.05 * -0.0791 -3.22 ** 
EFF*POORPERF -0.0294 -1.80 * -0.0241 -1.05   0.0516 5.26 ** 0.0347 4.55 ** 
EBLLP*POORPERF 0.0022 0.09   -0.0236 -2.79 * 0.0507 2.00 * -0.0043 -0.27   
LOAN*POORPERF 0.0056 1.96 * 0.0025 1.68   -0.0001 -0.06   0.0002 0.18   
LG*POORPERF -0.0001 -1.02   -0.0001 -0.96   0.0000 0.98   0.0000 -0.34   
COMM*POORPERF -0.0083 -8.63 *** -0.0074 -7.81 *** -0.0020 -2.24 * -0.0027 -5.93 *** 
RE*POORPERF -0.0007 -0.49   -0.0009 -0.65   0.0014 0.73   0.0012 0.88   
CONS*POORPERF -0.0041 -1.65   -0.0060 -3.36 ** 0.0010 0.38   0.0007 0.24   
CAP*POORPERF -0.0101 -11.13 *** -0.0105 -4.20 ** -0.0026 -2.49 * 0.0001 0.05   
LIQUID*POORPERF 0.0008 0.50   -0.0033 -1.72   0.0003 0.87   0.0004 0.55   
ΔGDP*POORPERF -0.0177 -1.09   -0.0104 -0.46   -0.0046 -0.49   -0.0099 -1.27   
SIZE 0.0000 1.45   0.0002 10.96 *** 0.0001 3.35 ** 0.0002 6.94 *** 
ABSGAP 0.0011 6.11 *** 0.0013 7.48 *** 0.0003 4.46 ** 0.0006 8.25 *** 
FEE -0.0006 -2.36 * -0.0019 -6.29 *** -0.0005 -6.26 *** -0.0022 -16.05 *** 
ROAVOL 0.3179 7.16 *** 0.3386 8.71 *** 0.0912 5.44 ** 0.2437 6.02 *** 
EFF -0.0230 -2.28 * -0.0146 -2.21   0.0009 1.10   0.0233 6.13 *** 
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EBLLP 0.1010 5.16 ** 0.0877 5.18 ** 0.0745 20.31 *** 0.0569 8.01 *** 
LOAN 0.0025 3.38 ** 0.0031 2.94 * 0.0016 3.22 ** 0.0029 3.03 * 
LG 0.0004 6.48 *** 0.0003 5.63 ** 0.0001 7.58 *** 0.0002 3.48 ** 
COMM -0.0011 -1.12   -0.0018 -1.56   0.0000 -0.12   -0.0009 -2.16   
RE 0.0003 0.96   -0.0001 -0.12   -0.0008 -2.87 * -0.0015 -2.63 * 
CONS -0.0015 -3.03 * -0.0017 -2.16   0.0006 4.39 ** 0.0003 1.04   
CAP 0.0010 0.62   -0.0025 -3.71 ** -0.0037 -10.37 *** -0.0092 -8.12 *** 
LIQUID -0.0024 -3.75 ** -0.0024 -4.07 ** -0.0004 -5.68 ** -0.0008 -5.17 ** 
ΔGDP -0.1230 -1.09   -0.1605 -1.18   0.0937 1.23   -0.1969 -1.43   
Year dummies Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R square 76.55%     76.20%     63.18%     51.27%     
No. obs   18,358        17,514        18,358        17,514      
 
Table 5 Analysis of the relation between conservatism and loan quality depending on lending growth cycles 
  Dep Var=NPL at t+1 Dep Var=NCO at t+1 
  CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept -0.0006 -0.22   0.0014 0.37   -0.0045 -1.98   -0.0070 -2.94 * 
CON*LOW -0.0010 -2.26 * -0.0018 -6.41 *** -0.0008 -7.31 *** -0.0006 -4.63 ** 
CON*MOD -0.0001 -0.47   -0.0004 -1.68   -0.0002 -3.84 ** -0.0004 -2.66 * 
CON*HIGH -0.0047 -22.56 *** -0.0066 -19.86 *** -0.0014 -6.12 *** -0.0017 -5.09 ** 
HIGH 0.0094 3.18 * 0.0071 1.66   0.0068 2.53 * 0.0077 3.06 * 
MOD 0.0028 0.85   0.0053 1.15   -0.0019 -0.99   -0.0028 -1.60   
LQ 0.6777 36.80 *** 0.6699 107.34 *** 0.5803 31.20 *** 0.0621 4.97 ** 
SIZE 0.0001 1.80   0.0001 3.60 ** 0.0001 5.66 ** 0.4850 16.06 *** 
ABSGAP 0.0013 41.89 *** 0.0014 13.40 *** 0.0004 4.47 ** 0.0001 5.71 ** 
FEE -0.0004 -1.13   -0.0013 -3.63 ** -0.0009 -35.27 *** 0.0003 5.80 ** 
ROAVOL 0.2749 6.44 *** 0.2800 6.75 *** 0.1402 4.60 ** -0.0012 -8.68 *** 
EFF -0.0294 -4.17 ** -0.0267 -5.25 ** 0.0081 3.44 ** 0.1079 4.65 ** 
EBLLP 0.0892 11.26 *** 0.0767 5.35 ** 0.0537 6.83 *** 0.0150 9.55 *** 
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LOAN 0.0033 3.90 ** 0.0032 3.77 ** 0.0014 4.66 ** 0.0532 10.75 *** 
LG 0.0003 10.54 *** 0.0003 8.42 *** 0.0001 24.52 *** 0.0021 4.27 ** 
COMM -0.0021 -2.96 * -0.0029 -5.39 ** -0.0003 -7.16 *** 0.0001 4.15 ** 
RE 0.0003 0.72   0.0002 0.35   -0.0005 -4.07 ** -0.0011 -13.42 *** 
CONS -0.0025 -3.84 ** -0.0024 -6.17 *** 0.0007 2.48 * -0.0012 -4.54 ** 
CAP -0.0013 -1.72   -0.0038 -2.98 * -0.0038 -5.65 ** 0.0002 1.01   
LIQUID -0.0022 -4.39 ** -0.0028 -4.28 ** -0.0004 -5.61 ** -0.0055 -6.71 *** 
ΔGDP -0.1131 -0.95   -0.2174 -1.33   0.0910 1.07   -0.0001 -0.60   
Year dummies Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R square 76.59%     76.19%     62.52%     64.23%     
No. obs      18,358           17,514           18,358           17,514      
 
Table 6 Analysis of the relation between conservatism and loan quality depending on bank size 
Panel A: Using C-Score_LLP as CON measure 
 
  Dep Var=NPL at t+1 Dep Var=NCO at t+1 
  CON= C-Score_LLP 
  Large Medium Small Large Medium Small 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept -0.0043 -2.55 * -0.0015 -0.86   -0.0078 -1.38   -0.0004 -1.50   -0.0017 -2.18   -0.0050 -9.09 *** 
CON -0.0013 -9.53 *** -0.0025 -13.68 *** -0.0017 -10.74 *** -0.0006 -6.79 *** -0.0008 -5.04 ** -0.0009 -5.58 ** 
LQ 0.6763 15.25 *** 0.6465 43.62 *** 0.6630 42.15 *** 0.6114 65.40 *** 0.5785 18.91 *** 0.5124 28.78 *** 
SIZE 0.0001 1.41   -0.0001 -0.59   -0.0005 -2.41 * 0.0001 3.03 * 0.0001 1.91   0.0000 0.15   
ABSGAP 0.0008 2.99 * 0.0021 10.49 *** 0.0020 17.85 *** 0.0005 6.64 *** 0.0003 2.44 * 0.0004 5.05 ** 
FEE 0.0013 1.69   -0.0027 -3.22 ** -0.0018 -4.08 ** -0.0009 -36.87 *** -0.0011 -28.27 *** -0.0006 -8.11 *** 
ROAVOL 0.3237 5.43 ** 0.2660 4.55 ** 0.2798 3.27 ** 0.1578 5.68 ** 0.1257 3.83 ** 0.0872 2.05   
EFF -0.0336 -2.55 * -0.0146 -2.19   -0.0326 -4.44 ** 0.0002 0.14   0.0149 3.70 ** 0.0049 1.55   
EBLLP 0.0857 2.37 * 0.0505 2.31   0.1200 6.84 *** 0.0665 15.80 *** 0.0338 3.95 ** 0.0770 6.98 *** 
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The table reports the OLS regression results of the effect of conservatism on loan quality depending on the lending growth cycles. All variables are winsorized at 
1th and 99th percentiles. Please refer to the appendix for the definitions of these variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in the parentheses. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
  
LOAN 0.0010 0.53   -0.0010 -0.82   0.0086 2.53 * 0.0032 4.60 ** 0.0004 2.07   0.0026 2.80 * 
LG 0.0003 2.76 * 0.0004 4.23 ** 0.0003 1.65   0.0001 4.10 ** 0.0002 7.37 *** 0.0001 2.41 * 
COMM -0.0001 -0.02   -0.0010 -1.54   -0.0028 -1.03   -0.0024 -5.27 ** 0.0004 1.46   -0.0011 -1.91   
RE 0.0027 1.20   0.0025 3.04 * -0.0029 -1.15   -0.0019 -5.33 ** -0.0001 -0.50   -0.0016 -2.81 * 
CONS 0.0014 0.52   0.0012 1.29   -0.0052 -1.56   -0.0016 -7.21 *** 0.0006 1.12   0.0006 1.21   
CAP -0.0137 -2.58 * 0.0117 7.42 *** -0.0064 -1.15   -0.0075 -5.95 *** -0.0022 -2.16   -0.0018 -1.07   
LIQUID -0.0031 -2.24   -0.0052 -4.47 ** 0.0018 1.67   -0.0001 -1.37   -0.0012 -4.90 ** 0.0002 0.31   
ΔGDP 0.1300 1.62   0.1445 1.67   0.3499 1.42   -0.0536 -2.85 * 0.0054 0.36   0.1456 4.90 ** 
Year dummies Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R square 79.39%     75.05%     69.50%     68.36%     60.41%     52.65%     
No. obs        7,618             6,697             4,043             7,618             6,697             4,043      
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Panel B: Using LLP_ASY as CON measure 
  Dep Var=NPL at t+1 Dep Var=NCO at t+1 
  CON= LLP_ASY 
  Large Medium Small Large Medium Small 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept -0.0085 -5.28 ** 0.0016 0.70   0.0681 15.72 *** -0.0071 -3.20 ** -0.0038 -1.44   0.0068 1.50   
CON -0.0032 -49.92 *** -0.0031 -19.74 *** -0.0021 -7.55 *** -0.0011 -5.09 ** -0.0012 -4.16 ** -0.0008 -4.70 ** 
LQ 0.6925 74.52 *** 0.6549 99.31 *** 0.6428 33.86 *** 0.6339 41.01 *** 0.5527 14.09 *** 0.5046 26.00 *** 
SIZE 0.0003 8.01 *** 0.0001 0.92   -0.0009 -2.82 * 0.0002 3.86 ** 0.0002 3.41 ** -0.0001 -1.80   
ABSGAP 0.0008 11.93 *** 0.0022 30.17 *** 0.0019 5.46 ** 0.0006 12.15 *** 0.0003 2.45 * 0.0004 4.21 ** 
FEE -0.0001 -0.11   -0.0038 -7.21 *** -0.0039 -10.48 *** -0.0014 -10.62 *** -0.0017 -8.58 *** -0.0008 -4.52 ** 
ROAVOL 0.2974 17.62 *** 0.3136 6.77 *** 0.3064 2.91 * 0.1785 14.58 *** 0.1384 4.82 ** 0.0714 1.94   
EFF -0.0185 -3.97 ** -0.0098 -1.73   -0.0343 -2.32   0.0084 5.57 ** 0.0231 4.38 ** 0.0069 1.55   
EBLLP 0.0647 4.41 ** 0.0362 1.50   0.1197 2.90 * 0.0464 29.56 *** 0.0163 1.23   0.0686 7.47 *** 
LOAN 0.0031 3.93 ** 0.0016 1.47   0.0095 3.44 ** 0.0023 4.16 ** 0.0017 4.98 ** 0.0039 5.58 ** 
LG 0.0003 2.67 * 0.0003 3.89 ** 0.0005 2.09   0.0001 4.00 ** 0.0002 4.12 ** 0.0001 1.20   
COMM -0.0037 -3.63 ** -0.0042 -3.50 ** -0.0016 -0.59   -0.0019 -6.92 *** -0.0007 -3.32 ** -0.0026 -6.10 *** 
RE -0.0005 -0.78   0.0004 0.39   -0.0015 -0.53   -0.0011 -4.38 ** -0.0009 -4.27 ** -0.0030 -8.64 *** 
CONS -0.0023 -2.54 * -0.0010 -0.88   -0.0046 -1.53   0.0003 1.34   0.0000 0.20   -0.0009 -2.23   
CAP -0.0120 -9.66 *** 0.0052 1.99   -0.0025 -0.47   -0.0087 -11.53 *** -0.0030 -7.35 *** -0.0041 -2.44 * 
LIQUID -0.0030 -3.83 ** -0.0054 -8.74 *** 0.0021 3.21 ** -0.0002 -0.95   -0.0010 -5.69 ** -0.0001 -0.24   
ΔGDP 0.2585 4.58 ** -0.0534 -0.56   -2.7033 -12.61 *** 0.1915 2.76 * 0.0361 0.34   -0.2676 -1.54   
Year dummies Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R square 81.71%     75.37%     68.90%     70.82%     59.44%     53.07%     
No. obs        6,968             6,378             4,168             6,968             6,378             4,168      
The table reports the OLS regression results of the effect of conservatism on loan quality depending on the size of the banks. The banks are classified as small if 
banks have total assets between $500 million and $1 billion, medium if banks have total assets between 1 billion and 3 billion, and large if banks have total assets 
more than 3 billion. All variables are winsorized at 1th and 99th percentiles. Please refer to the appendix for the definitions of these variables. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
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Table 7 Change Specifications 
   Dep Var= Change in NPL  Dep Var= Change NCO 
  CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept -0.0033 -7.39 *** -0.0032 -6.33 *** -0.0005 -3.86 ** -0.0004 -3.43 ** 
ΔCON -0.0001 -8.38 *** -0.0005 -3.50 ** 0.0000 -4.51 ** -0.0003 -5.67 ** 
ΔLQ -0.1422 -20.16 *** -0.1731 -18.69 *** -0.2285 -10.79 *** -0.2544 -8.89 *** 
ΔSIZE 0.0026 6.11 *** 0.0031 9.34 *** 0.0009 4.33 ** 0.0010 4.18 ** 
ΔABSGAP 0.0008 11.41 *** 0.0008 5.54 ** 0.0001 1.45   0.0001 1.54   
ΔFEE -0.0006 -0.78   -0.0008 -1.76   -0.0010 -4.10 ** -0.0012 -5.24 ** 
ΔROAVOL -0.0521 -0.99   -0.0742 -1.48   0.0341 2.03   0.0176 1.61   
ΔEFF -0.0449 -1.73   -0.0601 -1.87   -0.0268 -2.99 * -0.0338 -3.25 ** 
ΔEBLLP 0.1292 17.71 *** 0.1339 9.21 *** 0.0451 6.59 *** 0.0620 6.52 *** 
ΔLOAN 0.0113 7.67 *** 0.0113 4.95 ** 0.0056 3.24 ** 0.0036 2.71 * 
ΔLG 0.0001 2.05   0.0001 2.82 * 0.0000 0.73   0.0000 1.57   
ΔCOMM 0.0034 0.99   0.0032 1.15   0.0000 0.03   0.0024 1.97   
ΔRE 0.0024 1.56   0.0010 1.78   -0.0005 -0.47   0.0012 1.55   
ΔCONS -0.0116 -4.63 ** -0.0135 -5.63 ** 0.0009 0.80   0.0017 1.40   
ΔCAP 0.0029 1.00   0.0054 1.99   -0.0017 -0.61   -0.0009 -0.29   
ΔLIQUID 0.0008 0.32   -0.0017 -0.61   0.0011 3.74 ** 0.0005 2.96 * 
ΔGDP -0.0920 -2.97 * -0.0329 -0.97   -0.0424 -4.31 ** -0.0326 -3.08 * 
Year 
dummies 
Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R 
square 31.24%     31.21%     24.08% 
    
24.00% 
    
No. obs      16,249           15,493           16,249           15,493      
The table reports the baseline regression in first-differences where change in loan quality (change from t+1 to t+2) is regressed on change in CON and change in 
control variables (change from t to t+1). All variables are winsorized at 1th and 99th percentiles. Please refer to the appendix for the definitions of these 
variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
56 
 
Table 8 Using alternative proxies for monitoring effort (Replication of Table 2) 
  Dep var=Z-Score Dep var=adjSalExp 
  CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY CON=C-Score_LLP CON=LLP_ASY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept 0.2586 2.65 * 0.5796 2.79 * -0.0609 -3.29 *** -0.0528 -1.01   
CON 0.2360 31.01 *** 0.2093 25.99 *** 0.0246 12.79 *** 0.0195 14.79 *** 
SIZE 0.0177 6.09 *** 0.0126 3.58 ** -0.0001 -0.15   -0.0002 -5.99 *** 
ABSGAP -0.1602 -14.84 *** -0.1632 -14.50 *** -0.0071 -1.81 * -0.0005 -0.39   
FEE 0.4556 12.94 *** 0.3220 12.76 *** 0.0418 3.39 *** 0.0399 8.04 *** 
ROAVOL -171.8800 -13.03 *** -170.1463 -12.60 *** -5.0346 -7.32 *** -5.0765 -79.17 *** 
EFF -8.6151 -8.03 *** -7.6533 -7.96 *** 0.0329 0.28   -0.0466 -0.36   
EBLLP 38.4854 9.31 *** 36.1747 13.10 *** 0.5037 1.68 * 1.0849 7.06 *** 
LOAN 0.0537 0.62   0.2228 2.28   0.0873 4.20 *** 0.0633 7.46 *** 
LG 0.0225 4.57 ** 0.0191 3.22 ** 0.0000 0.05   -0.0012 -1.01   
COMM -0.1972 -2.34   -0.4377 -8.43 *** -0.0371 -1.54   -0.0196 -3.03 * 
RE -0.2946 -3.22 ** -0.6417 -6.48 *** -0.0654 -3.11 *** -0.0503 -6.90 *** 
CONS 0.7917 5.61 ** 0.4206 2.85 * -0.0927 -3.28 *** -0.0572 -6.06 *** 
CAP 2.1486 12.94 *** 2.4551 28.10 *** 0.2732 6.60 *** 0.2543 9.41 *** 
LIQUID 0.2042 5.76 ** 0.1178 2.39 * 0.0355 2.64 *** 0.0278 10.88 *** 
ΔGDP 5.2561 3.49 ** -4.1188 -0.48   -0.3433 -2.83 *** 0.5091 0.20   
Year 
dummies 
Yes 
    
Yes 
    
Yes     Yes     
Adj. R 
square 16.67%     14.95%     16.88% 
    
16.82% 
    
No. obs      18,358           17,514           18,358           17,514      
 
The table reports the OLS regression results of the effect of conservatism on loan quality using alternative dependent variables, Z-score and (negative) risk and 
industry-median adjusted salary expense. The Z-score measures the distance from insolvency. Because bank size and loan composition affect salary expense 
significantly, the median salary is calculated for each size tercile within the tercile based on the ratio of commercial loans to total assets for each quarter. All 
variables are winsorized at 1th and 99th percentiles. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
57 
 
 
Table 9 Corporate Governance Subsample Analysis 
Panel A: Using C-Score_LLP as a dependent variable 
  Dep var =NPL at t+1 Dep Var =NCO at t+1 
  CON= Cscore_LLP 
  Poor Governance Strong Governance Poor Governance Strong Governance 
  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
Intercept -0.005 -5.19 ** -0.006 -4.06 ** -0.011 -3.39 ** -0.009 -5.68 ** 
CON -0.001 -5.67 ** -0.001 -8.74 *** -0.003 -45.90 *** -0.003 -16.98 *** 
LQ 0.676 9.62 *** 0.584 11.78 *** 0.706 37.38 *** 0.633 74.18 *** 
SIZE 0.000 3.17 * 0.000 4.97 ** 0.000 30.54 *** 0.000 13.88 *** 
ABSGAP 0.000 -2.63 * 0.001 2.63 * 0.000 3.90 ** 0.001 2.96 * 
FEE 0.001 1.20   0.002 1.77   0.000 -0.68   0.001 0.86   
ROAVOL 0.447 3.24 ** 0.121 3.88 ** 0.450 13.78 *** 0.111 4.51 ** 
EFF -0.037 -3.16 * -0.035 -1.74   -0.027 -4.25 ** -0.020 -3.71 ** 
EBLLP 0.110 3.95 ** 0.078 1.54   0.103 5.07 ** 0.050 4.61 ** 
LOAN 0.004 3.88 ** -0.007 -3.23 ** 0.006 30.39 *** -0.002 -1.22   
LG 0.000 0.77   0.000 0.87   0.000 0.37   0.000 1.25   
COMM 0.000 -0.24   0.009 2.94 * -0.004 -13.41 *** 0.002 1.34   
RE 0.000 -0.04   0.011 4.09 ** -0.003 -4.00 ** 0.006 5.57 ** 
CONS 0.001 0.34   0.009 2.99 * -0.002 -2.24   0.002 2.21   
CAP -0.022 -4.09 ** -0.005 -1.11   -0.017 -4.24 ** -0.006 -2.81 * 
LIQUID -0.002 -1.84   -0.003 -1.86   -0.001 -2.32   -0.003 -1.90   
ΔGDP 0.149 1.41   0.107 1.78   0.246 1.96   0.164 1.59   
Year dummies Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Adj. R square 76.48%     78.09%     81.82%     80.92%     
No. obs      3,698           3,634           3,138           3,153      
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Panel B: Using LLP_ASY as a dependent variable 
Dep var =NPL at t+1 Dep Var =NCO at t+1 
CON= LLP_ASY 
Poor Governance Strong Governance Poor Governance Strong Governance 
Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat   
0.000 0.07   -0.001 -2.06   -0.011 -5.74 ** -0.006 -4.33 ** 
0.000 -5.77 ** -0.001 -5.98 *** -0.001 -4.33 ** -0.001 -4.34 ** 
0.635 51.09 *** 0.583 32.50 *** 0.628 28.62 *** 0.639 34.37 *** 
0.000 1.09   0.000 3.18 * 0.000 4.30 ** 0.000 3.06 * 
0.000 0.89   0.001 5.40 ** 0.000 3.07 * 0.001 5.74 ** 
0.000 -1.29   -0.001 -1.32   -0.001 -6.15 *** -0.001 -2.04   
0.085 1.99   0.085 7.01 *** 0.100 4.68 ** 0.104 9.43 *** 
-0.008 -2.67 * -0.003 -0.59   0.001 0.53   0.006 1.23   
0.093 6.98 *** 0.071 7.48 *** 0.073 7.72 *** 0.051 4.83 ** 
0.003 9.19 *** 0.004 2.00   0.003 5.63 ** 0.003 2.04   
0.000 1.78   0.000 5.75 ** 0.000 1.13   0.000 3.66 ** 
-0.001 -4.21 ** -0.003 -1.99   -0.002 -7.74 *** -0.003 -2.51 * 
-0.002 -28.63 *** -0.002 -1.75   -0.002 -9.82 *** -0.002 -1.85   
-0.002 -2.58 * -0.001 -0.89   -0.002 -5.09 ** 0.001 2.14   
-0.006 -2.83 * -0.008 -3.11 * -0.007 -7.76 *** -0.007 -3.58 ** 
0.000 -2.25   0.000 -1.78   0.000 -1.42   0.000 -1.44   
-0.037 -2.26   -0.043 -2.54 * 0.376 6.40 *** 0.147 2.98 * 
Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
68.44%     70.13%     69.91%     74.01%     
     3,698           3,634           3,138           3,153      
The table reports the OLS regression results of the effect of conservatism on loan quality depending on corporate governance. I divide the sample into weak and 
strong governance subsamples and repeat the regression analysis on these two subsamples seapartely. I use Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)’s G-score as a 
summary (inverse) measure of the strength of firms’ corporate governance. Firms whose G-score equals or exceeds the median for the full sample are classified 
as “weak governance”, and the remainder are placed in the “strong governance” subsample. All variables are winsorized at 1th and 99th percentiles. Please refer 
to the appendix for the definitions of these variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
